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this

ABSTRACT

Although a study of Canadian--American interplay in Asia
from 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 7 reveals marked similarities in the attitudes
of both countries, it also uncovers some Interesting diffe
rences.; In view of the power disparity between Canada and the
United States, one may be tempted to attribute the similarities
solely to American predominance.

A closer study of Canadian

reactions to American policy, however, reveals that it is due
as much to the Canadian perception of events in Asia as to
United States predominance.

This discussion of Canadian-

American interplay in Asia will show that, in the final analy
sis, these singularly Canadian perceptions dictated her po
licies, and that Canada was not prepared to follow blindly the
ramifications of United States policy.

The American influence

on Canadian policy, although undeniably present, was not always
the overriding Canadian concern.
Canadian-American interplay during the Korean War and in

Vietnam has shown that the extent to which Canada was prepared
to go in following the American lead was determined more by
her concept of national interest than by securing a sympathetic
outlook from Washington.

Canadian action on the question of

Communist Chinese recognition can also be seen as an attempt
to further these interests, but in this instance defering to
American views in the interest of maintaining Canadian-American
ill
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rapport was thought to be in Canada's best interest.
In all three areas of study, reasonable justification
for Canadian positions can be found in terms other than a
simple deference to Washington per se.

Although the line

between deference and self-interest may at times become
blurred, at no time did Canada forego what she believed to
be a pursuit of singularly Canadian interests in favor of
those of the United States,
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I
INTRODUCTION
aspect of Canadian-American relations is condition
ed by the fact that the United States is a super-power and
Canada is not.

This is always at the heart of their mutual
1

involvement anywhere, but it is seen especially in Asia.

In

herent volatility and the People's Republic of China combine
to make Asia an extremely difficult area with which to deal.
Moreover, Canada has neither the power nor the capacity to
pursue as wide a range of global endeavor as does the United
States.

Because the latter is committed in Asia presently in

Vietnam, previously in Korea and Euomintang China, and before
World War II in trade and the "Open Door" policy, Canadian
involvement must defer to an American presence which has been
p
evident since the late eighteenth century." There is, in ad-

1
For our purposes, the term "Asia" will mean the Southern,
South-Eastern and Eastern portions of the continent, compris
ing Indochina, China, India and Korea, but excluding Soviet
Asia, the Middle East and, unless otherwise referred to, fringe
portions such as Indonesia, Malaysia etc. Japan, admittedly,
is a special case, as are the Philippines, and unless otherwise
stated, will not fall under the term "Asia" in this discussion.

2
The earliest United States trading contacts with China
date from the 1784 voyage of Empress of China.
Between that
time and 1811, the United States was the "most serious rival
of the British in tea trade at Canton." See P.E. Clyde,
The
Far East : A History of the Impact of the Rest on Eastern A s i a .
New York: 1952, p. 126-129.
The quote appears on p. 127.

1
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2
dltlon, another aspect of American involvement which poses
difficulties for the Canadian position in Asia - the American
notion of a messianic mission to deliver the world generally
3
and Asia specifically from Communism.
Before dealing with the more complex reasons for Ameri-

cari involvement, it will be useful to define the concept of
interplay as it pertains here.

Interplay will mean a mutual

involvement in Asia on the part of Canada and the United Sta
tes.

This does not mean, however, an involvement by one

simply because the other has chosen to formulate or imple
ment policy vis-a-vis a specific Asian area.

That is, a

prior amenability, other than the warrants of normal diplo
matic activity, is not suggested.

Interplay does suggest,

however, that in areas where both have chosen to become involved there is influence on one or the other corresponding
to their individual power positions, and how one country

3
See E. Stillman and W. Pfaff, The New Politics: America and the Post War World. (New York : '1 9 61 ')"p. 23 and
A similar view is taken by J. ¥. Spanier. American Foreign
Policy Since World War II, (New York: 1960) p.1-13.
It is also important to note here that the American con
ception of Asia . before World War II included mainly China,
the Philippines and Japan.
It was with China and the Phili
ppines, however, that American tutelage was especially in ev
idence. See H. R. Isaacs. Scratches on Our Minds; American
Images of India and China. (New York; 196 2 ) ('5'apr'icorn Edl-"
tion).
Canada, however, looked at Asia very much in terms of
the British Asian Empire, later Commonwealth, of India, Cey
lon and later Pakistan, since these were her main contacts
with that continent.
The significance of these tw^ dissimilar views of Asia
become important, especially in light of developments in
China since 1949.
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3
perceives the relevance of that particular position in the
context of the then existing situation.

While for Canada,

American support will normally be sought in any dealings, in
certain situations Canada will also defer to American policy
in favor of continuing Canadian-American rapport.

Conversely,

while the Canadian position generally is not as important to
the United States, there will be times when Canada's support
is valuable to American policy.

In these situations Ameri

can policy will, in turn, either defer to or encourage the
Canadian position.
Simply, interplay will be an examination of fields of ac
tivity where Canada and the United States have seen fit to
formulate a policy which elicits some action by the other.
From this it may be determined what is the extent of influ4
ence either on Canada or the United States.
Similarly, the
extent to which Canada will conform to United States policy
will also become apparent and, when she does not, how far she
will diverge and why.

Interplay, then, with special reference

to Canada, will be a study of questions that are of significant import to warrant defined policy, and the degree to
which that policy is or is not pursued when the United States
is involved.

With this in mind we can now deal with some of

4
There are influences on Canada other than that of the
United States.
The attitudes of Great Britain and India have,
on occasion, been among the determinants of Canadian policy.
However, it will not be within the scope of this paper to deal
with all of them, but only those which in some way have an effect on Canadian-American mutual Involvement.
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4
the reasons for American Involvement In Asia.
The United States has had somewhat of an emotional Id5
entlflcation with Asia.
It was the United States, among
others, which tried to educate and civilize parts of Asia
with missionary and medical teams since the second half of
the nineteenth century.

Similarly, it was the United States

6
which tried to save Ohiang Kai-shek's regime from 1941-1949.
She did so obviously not only out of self-interest, but out
of a conviction that if Asia (i.e.China) could not take care
of herself then America would try to do it for her.

This

attitude was a form of spiritual "Manifest Destiny" to lead
7
Asia from the "wilderness".
There grew, then, a special
kinship with parts of Asia that has, in varying degrees, ner8
vaded American dealings with her.
This mission, however.
5
On this point see Isaacs, op. cit.. Chapters 5-9, ahd
also J.K. Fairbank, The United States and China,(Cambridge:
1 9 6 2 , Chapter l4. Also, Foster Hhea Dulles, China and America: The Story of their Relations Since 1784,
Y o r ^ ^ f 9 6 7)
and' A . Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United
ütates, (New Haven: 1 9 6 2 ) Chapter 1, esp. p. 17.
6
See Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1949,
(Chicago, 1963) and The China White Paper, August 1949,
(Stanford: 1967).
The last is the official United States
record of involvement in China, with emphasis on the period
194l— 19 4 9 .

7
See I.L. Horowitz, The Three Worlds of Development; The
Theory and Practice of International"'"stfatification. (New
York: 1 9 6 6 ) Chapter's 3 and 4"! Also 'Stillman and Pfaff, o p .
bit., p. 23 .

8
See Tyler Dennett, Americans in East Asia, (New York:
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5
has been plagued by a general lack of success in Aslan in
volvement since World War II.

Indeed, Euomintang China fell,

SEATO was less than effective, Korea is still divided, and
Vietnam is, in 1969, a blight oh American policy.

It was

paradoxical, moreover, that all this was thrust upon the
acknowledged most powerful nation in the world.

Thus, be

cause of the enormous American capabilities, anything less
than complete success in Asian dealings brought disillusion..
All these factors complicate Canada's pursuit of her Asian
policies.
Canada, by virtue of common European heritage and simi
lar cultures, finds herself in the difficult position of at
once supporting United States grand goals In Asia, while
necessarily hesitating at some of the means to effect them.
While it was, and very much still is, in Canada's interest
to support America's world posture, if not her tactics, she

Tite of the United States.

Canada, therefore, has had to

walk the narrow line between possible subordinance and pursuit of self-interest in order to realize the goals that are
t
”
' ""
set by her concept of the "middle power". Thus, hers was
the difficult task of fulfilling the American desire for
support, while avoiding the stigma of appearing merely a
1926) Chapter 19. Also J.W. Masland, "Missionary Influence
Upon American Far Eastern Policy", Pacific Historical Review.
Vol.X, September 3, 194l, p.279-296, and W.E. Daughtery,
"China's Official Publicity in the United States", Public
Opinion Quarterly. Spring 1942, p.70-86.
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6
"rubber-stamp" for American policy.

This pursuit as It per

tained to Asia was a particularly difficult one to realize.
Because Canada was not deeply involved in Asia until
after 1945, her activity there had been determined by lar
ger global circumstances.

Professor Spencer suggests that

not until Chiang's fall could Canada be said to have a pe
culiarly Asiatic policy, that is, a policy in which OanadianAsian circumstances were at the root instead of Canadianglobal ones.

Her policies there were facilitated by the fact

that she was neither mean nor offensive and had herself once
been a colony.

The fact is that, outside of India, Canada

has had no special ties with Asia.

Indeed, she has by any

standard been pragmatic in her Asian dealings, and her pol
icies there have been dictated more by logic than by mêssianism.

This fact is at once the reason why she has the poten

tial to pursue an independent approach to Asia, and why she
must at times accord deference to American pretensions in the
area.
However, if logic dictates that a Canadian presence in
Asia can be helpful to world peace and, in turn, Canadian in
terests, then it also dictates that the United States can be
a more useful friend than enemy.

Her Asian involvement,

therefore, must be conditioned to a great degree by anticipa
ted American reactions.

The point at which Canada presumably

foregoes her own interpretation of Asian circumstances
those of the United States, is necessarily the point at which
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American Influence
either lessens her

acknnwl edged .

Conversely, where

ftnt tn Amerirnn policy, or takes a
x y 1.n,v.olT

pgsTtion where sh.

ved as the United States, then Canada takes a more independent approach to her foreign policy.
The fact is, that while Canada rarely initiates sweep
ing policy, she does react to great power endeavors.

The

degree of reaction to United States policies, then, is often
the measure of Canada's independence in foreign policy.

It

will be the purpose of this paper to show that Canadian pol
icies in Asia are largely reactions to American policies
there, not unilateral Canadian decisions.

Towards Korea,

Vietnam and the question of Communist Chinese recognition,
Canadian policies have been largely influenced by American
positions and policies.r-In thèse areas Canada has shown a forebearance to American policies even when an independent role would
have been useful in the form of greater world security.

It will

also be seen that Canadian influence has been effective only in
areas where it

modifier of American policy, and only,

then when it was accompanied by similar American predispositio ns .
In such instances as these, Canada's reaction was dictated more
b y ' ^ I f - i n t e r est and concern for w orld peace than by United
States influence.

Basically, hppansp Canada was not prepared

to pursue at length all the ramifications of America^ policies.
she tried to tone them down.

To that extent at least, Canada's

desire for continued ease in Canadian-American relations was
superceded by her concern for world security.
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II
BACKGROUND: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
AFTER UORLD WAR II
In discussing Canadian-American interplay in Asia since
World War II it will be necessary to examine briefly the wide
range of goals and policies pursued by both countries since
1945.

The extent and effectiveness of mutual involvement in

Asia can only be determined within the context of the general
foreign policy orientations of Canada and the United States.
It will be seen that the positions of both countries after
the war had much to do with their respective reactions to developments in Asia in succeeding years.
The close of World War II brought with it more than an
end to hostilities;

it brought, for all intents and purpos

es, a re-shuffling of the international state system.

Alth-

ough the war had been won, the victory proved a costly one for
the Allies.

While Germany had been defeated and Japan crip

pled, Great Britain and France had found it difficult to ad
just in the post-war years, and this was generally true of most
of Europe.

Indeed, there were few countries to come out of

that conflict relatively unscathed;
and the United States.

two of these were Canada

They were to form their post-war po

licy goals, therefore, in the context of a much stronger posi
tion

vis-a-vis most of the Wes t .

8
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9
Canada, unlike Britain and most of the other allies,
"had not been bled white economically In the effort to ach1

leve victory"

in World War II.

Unlike the other nations of

Europe "her territory had not been a battlefield, nor had
her people been subjugated by the occupation."^

She was,

moreover, in the throes of an economic expansion which was
"capable even of assisting the ruined great powers of the
3
pre-war world."
Indeed, given immunity from invasion,
Canada's development as a power in post-war politics was
4
inevitable.
As the post-war years progressed, however,
Canada soon found her immediate power position to be tenuous.
While she was not small enough to be ignored, neither was she
large enough to be feared, and Canada saw herself precariously
in the middle of the Cold War,

She was, therefore, "faced

with the problem of finding for herself a place in interna
tional councils appropriate to her position as something less
than a major and more than a minor p o w e r . I n

this pursuit.

1

II. Se ford, Canada and Three Crisis, (Lindsay, Ontario :
1 9 6 8 ) p.2.
See also R. Spender^ Canada in World Affairs 194619 4 9 , (Toronto:1959) Chapter I.

2
Ibid, p.2.

3
John Holmes, "Canadian External Policies Since 1945",
International Journal, Spring 1963, V 0 I . 1 8 , p.137-148.

4
H.P. Angus, Canada and the Far East 1940-1953, (Toronto:
1953) p.19.
5
Holmes, op.c i t . As will be seen in Chapter III this place
was the United Nations.
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10
moreover, she could not afford to neglect the one country
which would be most involved with any international role,
the United States.
While this search was first accentuated in the early
post-war years, it has become one of the aims of present day
Canadian policies.

How she has resolved it will go a long

way in explaining the general tone of Canadian-American interplay and will be dealt with more fully later.

6

Suffice

it to say now that her role evolved to one of nominal inde
pendence and pragmatic forebearanoe, largely unforseen in

1 94 5

.
For the United States, it was not as necessary to find

a role then, as to acCept the one thrust upon her.

At the

close of World War II she inherited the consequences of a
basic change in the global power structure.

This change was

a shift in the center of gravity in the Western world from
the capitals of Western Europe to Washington.

The end re^

8 & # o f a change which had been going on Imperceptibly for the
first half of the twentieth century, this shift was greatly
7
accelerated by the impact of two world wars.
More than a
difference of emphasis, however, this shift created a power
vacuum "in those parts of the world which had formerly been
6
See Conclusion,
7
World,

See, J.P. Warburg, The United States in the Post-war
(New York: 1966) p.30.
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11

owned, controlled or dominated by Western Europe

This

process had left the United States with more comprehensive
obligations and less opportunity for 'masterful inactivity'.^
Indeed, by 1948 it became apparent that ^masteffUl"inactivity"
was not going to forestall Communist expansion, nor could it
formulate policy to meet this expansion.
Basically the Soviet challenge "compelled the American
people (as well as the American government) to accept the
responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended it to bear.

While entanglement in

World War I did not succeed in awakening the United States
to a clear comprehension that responsibilities and national
power were one, perhaps involvement in World War II could.
Thus, after 1945, the United States was aware of at least
two factors.

One was that "responsibility conoommitant with

influence could not be avoided with impunity."

11

The other

was that the use of "American capabilities to influence

Ibid. p.30.

9
W.A. Wilcox, Asia and United States Policy, (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey :1967) p.1.
10

George Kennan, cited in D. Brandon, American Foreign
Policy; Beyond Utopianism and Realism. (New"York : 1966), p.4.
11
R.S.Synder and E.S. Furness, American Foreign Policy,
(New York:1954), p.571.
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12
the International environment was a necessity and a responsl12
blllty."
Awareness of responsibility, however, and effect
ing it proved to be two different things for American foreign
policy at that time.

The overwhelming national power possess

ed. by the United States after 1945 offered her one great po
tential advantage, the initiative.

"That the United States

has not taken the initiative more often sneaks to the pro13

blem of purpose rather than capacity."

The problem of

purpose, moreover, is evident in one word,containment.
It must be remembered at this point that, because Amer
ican capabilities and power were more stable than those of
Canada,

she could conceiveably outline definite foreign pol

icy goals.

Whatever else they may have been accused of being,

these goals were at least concise and with a purpose, to halt
the Communist threat.
Canada, however, could not be as sure-footed in her post
war relations.

Her greater power position after the war was

more inflated than that of the United States, more easily
subject to change, and thus more tenuous.

However, precisely

because she was not as powerful as the United States, her
policies could be more aspiriatibnal:andfthus more flexible.
Canada, it will be seen, evolved to a position, for example
12

Ibid, p.571 .
least proved that.

Soviet activity in Eastern Europe had at

13
Wilcox, op. cit., p.20.
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in Korea, where she could bend on Issues when the United
States could not.

Since American policies had outlined de

finite aims, subsequent positions would necessarily be jud
ged in that context.

Thus, when she had crossed the thirty-

eighth parallel and approached the Yalu, it became difficult
to turn back from what was ostensibly a desire to unify Korea
by force.

Because she had outlined a definite policy of con

tainment by that time, the United States was similarly hard
put to deviate suddenly and accept a theory of limited war.
Canada, however, did not find herself in such a position where
she would have to disavow her own hard and fast policy.
This difference in policy criteria is important in
Canadian-American relations, since it explains at once why
the United States is in a position to lose face while Canada
is not.

So too, it enables Canada to adjust her policy so as

not to incur needless hostility from Washington.

For this

reason, then, Canadian obduracy on questions not involving
world security will come more slowly and be reconciled more
easily than will Washington's.

This same Canadian obstinacy.

however, will also tend to make Washington less indulgent
when Ottawa's policy does not coincide with that of the
United States.

Because Canada can be more flexible on so

many issues, any deviation from the American "lead" will make
Washington look upon her less favorably.

Because the United

States has so much at stake in the form of prestige on vir*.
every question of international import, much more so
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than Canada, Canadian policy is thus expected to conform to
and complement that policy.

This American expectation and

the way in which Canada perceives it is an important factor
in Canadian-American relations and will be seen in the Com
munist Chinese recognition question.
The policy of containment was first formulated by George
"""

-

,

Kennan in his 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."
This concept was, and is now, the rationale for American
foreign policy.

In effect, containment was an answer to the

innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism....which
------------------- ^
------------------ .14
had become imbedded in the foundations of Soviet power,"
Since Russia was the most powerful Socialist state at the

time, Moscow and Socialism (i.e. Communism) were thought to
be synonymous.

Thus,the antagonism of Socialism and Capital

ism was felt to be one between Russia and the United States.
This antagonism, in turn, manifests itself in Moscow's expan

sive tendencies.

American foreign policy, it was felt, had

to contain this expansion.
Basically, the United States would meet the Russian ex
pansion wherever it occurred and "build situations of strength
15
to meet the Communist challenge."
Such was the rationale
(3 )
J. Burnham, Containment or Liberation. (New York;1952)
p.1 5 -2 1 .
15

Ibid, p.21. By the time containment was formulated,
what came to be known as the Cold War had set in. Russian ac
tivity in Eastern Europe and the Middle East seemed to cement
geographical divisions into ideological ones as well. It was
actions such as these which conditioned the Cold War, and it
was against this background that containment was formulated.
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15
for enormous aid to Europe through the Marshall Plan, Point
Pour and the Truman Doctrine.

In essence, containment was

going to make the world safe for democracy and, hopefully,
win friends in the process.

The policy was not totally an

ideological one, however.
Due to the Communist challenge, "Americans began to
realize that the security of Western Europe (and ultimately)
16
of the United States was threatened."
Thus,
Fearing that Moscow might take over so much of
the world as to make Soviet victory inevitable...
(the United States) decided that they would have
to mount some sort of counteraction.
They neither
wanted total war nor felt ready to fight one.
(American policy) therefore had to improvise ways
short of all-out fighting to halt the Soviet av
alanche.
17
Under the influence of Acheson, and later Dulles, containment
in one form or another, was to be the mainspring of American
foreign policy in the years after World War II.

While it was

designed primarily for application in Europe, it was later
used in Asia as well.

The fact that it was not as successful

in Asia served to complicate Canadian-American relations gen
erally, in addition to Canadian-American interplay in Korea
and Vietnam.
Canada had quite a different set of broad policy inter
ests after World War II.

While not as far-reaching or pre-

16
Ibid, p.3 0 .

17
Ibid. p.3 0 .
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else as those of the United States, Canada's Interests after
the war also conditioned her foreign policy in later years.
As the post-war years progressed and as Russian attitu
des grew increasingly obdurate, Canada had to resolve two
dichotomous tasks:

the concern with national identity or

independence in foreign policy and "the sober recognition of
18
the necessity for partnership with the United States."
Because

a

tntrl

nrrn*

Iw .lT ""'FIT'W'l'i'i

I'i'i.ill,;

l numn

p0 st-war years. Canada hgrnnir
"--------19
war might become an enemy in the next."

nnbl ovad

..

-rn
For Canada, one

of the most distressing results of the Cold War was the unenvlable position of being sandwiched geographically between
the two great antagonists, the United States and the TTGAR_
Thus, Canada's main policy concern would be the search for
security, globally in the United Nations and regionally in
Inherent in this search was a desire not to see the
two emerging superpowers engaged in all-out war.

Thus, in

the United Nations she would do all she could to relieve the
tension of the Cold War, but, failing this, she felt she
would be secure in the NATO alliance.
Springing from these conditions after Ubrld War II was
18
L.P.Singh, "Canada, The United States and Vietnam",
The Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.6, No.2,
(WihfefTTgbBl-pnSS-l^y, p. 125.— s%e also D.-Baldwin, "The
Myths of the Special Relationship", in 8 . Clarkson, ed..
An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada, (Toronto:l9 6 8 ).
19
l.
1959) p.VII.

vSpençer, .Canada in World Affairs 1946-1949. (Toronto
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a two-fold awareness on the part of Canadian policy-makers:
"a frank recognition that practically everything in inter
national politics was of Interest to Canada, and a willing20
ness to accept responsibility."
Because Canada became
increasingly aware of the growing East-West rift, and because
she had to alleviate its tension in hopes of preserving her
own security, she became "inextricably involved in the full
21
current of international affairs."
Canada, therefore, would
have to become positively involved in or engulfed by this
current.

In her efforts she realized the value of the United

Nations as an effective Instrument for political involvement
and NATO as an effective instrument for military security.
It is significant to note that, initially, these Canadian
interests were primarily attuned to events in Europe.
torically and culturally this was natural.

His

However, as ¥est-

ern Europe slowly recovered, and was therefore less suscep-

tible to the Communist threat, Canada found that the main
danger to world peace lay in Asia.

Thus, after 1950, when

the Korean Crisis broke out, Canada's pursuit of early post
war interests were focused more and more upon Asia.

Importantly, however, Canadian relations with Asia had
never been as profound as they had been with Europe, and their
20

Ibid, p.2.
21

House of Commons Debates (Canada) 1948, Vol.IV, p.3428.
He re after referred to as Debates.
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growth had been gradual.

Indeed, owing to the economic de

pression, expansion of the Canadian diplomatic service was
prevented, and this delayed an exchange of representatives
with China until 1942.

"

To that time, and after, "fellow

members in the Commonwealth afforded Canada their most in23
timate connection with Asia."
India was especially useful
in this regard, and Pearson himself had said that India was
24
the wedge through which Canada gained its foothold in Asia.
Outside of India, however, Canadian-Asian relations had
been slight.

Indeed, by 1952 total trade even with India had

h.B.Pearson, "Canada and the Far Fast", United A s i a ,
Vol.4, 1952, p.37-40.
There was, however, a legation in
Tokyo as early as 1929.
See G.P. de T.Glazebrook, A History
of Canadian External Relations, Vol.,II, (Toronto :1966) p.94.
23
Pearson, on. c i t .. p.38.
24
See M.S.Rajan, "The Indo-Ganadian Entente", in Intern
ational Journal, Vol.17, (Autumn: 1962) p.358-385, for an e:xcellent survey of Indo-Canadian relations.
Uhile Indo^Canadian relations have, on the whole, been
good, there ware points of friction.
One such difficulty,
perhaps the most important one, was the discriminatory Cana
dian immigration policy which prevented many non-Europeans
from entering Canada.
This policy was an expression of the
apprehension that many Canadians shared of indicrimlnateiylowering the barriers to oriental and non-white immigration.
Ostensibly the reason for this apprehension was the fear
of cheap labor which would be produced with the influx of nonEuropean immigrants.
In reality, however, the policy expressed
a desire to retain the racial balance in Canada, which in turn
meant preserving the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon and French
strains.
Thus, by 1921, there was a wide gulf between the
immigration policy in principle as formulated by Great Britain
and public sentiment in Canada toward Chinese, Japanese, or
"more embarrassingly British Indians."
See P.H.Clyde, op.cit.,
p.474-475.
Also Glazebrook, op.cit.. p.24-27, esp. p.25.
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25
amounted to only 283 million dollars (Can.).

In 1966,

however, Oanadian-Japanese trade alone amounted to over 330
million dollars (Can.) and by 1969 it is expected to reach
almost a billion dollars (Gan,),

The figures in Appendices I

and la, when contrasted with this estimate, go far in explain
ing Canada’s turn to the East since 1945.
While there were purely political reasons for Canada’s

2o
Asian involvement from 1945,
est played a large part.

the Canadian commercial inter

Because World War II brought the

realization that Canada was a Pacific as well as an Atlantic

power, she became concerned about the development and restor
ation of trans-Pacific trade which would, according to
27
Pearson, greatly stimulate the development of Western Canada,

It must be remembered, however, that in the period under
consideration, 1945-1968, Canadian immigration policies and
restrictions, although net in accord with the general multiracial aspect of the Commonwealth, were of little relative
importance.
Even the Canadian, and American, maltreatment
of orientals during World War II did not affect in any signiflcant way policies to be discussed in this paper.
The
Canadian efforts to find a place for an independent India in
the Commonwealth were thus much more beneficial to IndoOanadian relations in general than immigration and discrimi
natory policies were harmful.
25
Pearson, op.cit.. p.38.

26
Canada was a member of the Par Eastern Commission,
which was responsible for overseeing the terms of the Japan
ese surrender.
See Angus, op.cit., p. 56-57.

27
Cited in W.E.C. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs.
1949 to 1950. (Toronto: 1957) p.l6?l,
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Since her trade with Japan and other Aslan countries, although
never great, had drastically curtailed during the war, Canada
was Interested In utilizing once more Japan’s primary product

28
need,

and in finding a market for her own finished goods

in areas like Ceylon, Pakistan and India.

China, too, offered

great potential, and Canada’s huge grain sales to that coun
try since 196I have had political significance as well as eco29
nomic benefits.It was obvious, however, that trade could not be con
summated without peace and generally stable political condi
tions in Asia.

Thus, Canada was acutely interested in stav

ing off the extension of the Cold War to Asia.

However, with

the results of the Chinese Civil War, Canada recognized that
she would have to develop a genuine political interest in Asia,
as well as an economic one.

The fall of Chiang, who had been

underwritten to a great degree by the United States, meant a
de facto extension of the Cold War to Asia.

Thus, it was in

Canadian interests to pursue an avoidance of a hot war in Asia
which might involve the United States, in addition to promot
ing a peaceful political atmosphere in which to conduct trade.
A peaceful political atmosphere, however, was not enough
in itself to encourage trade with the underdeveloped countries

28
See A.R.M. Lower, Canada and the far East - 1940,
(New York:1940) esp. Chapter 5, and see also Appendix Ib,

29
See Appendix II.
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of Asia.

A program of aid and technical assistance was also

necessary.

Thus, Canada embarked upon the Colombo flan In

an attempt to better the economic viability, particularly of
the Asian Commonwealth nations.

The Colombo flan would pro

vide an opportunity "to co-operate in working toward better
economic conditions through a program of capital development
30
and technical assistance."
The.plan was not entirely tech
nical, however, in that it would ultimately help to "establish
3 good and sound society that would have t h e n o r al vigor and
confidence to resist the Communist appeal."

Significantly

Canadian membership in the plan was free of the taint of
great power association and, as such, served as a remedial
experiment in East-West relations.

Because Canada was his

torically unsoiled by imperialism, and, by virtue of her as
sociation in the Colombo flan, was a Western country which
appeared to show genuine concern for the Asian alight, her
actions in Korea were much less suspect as those of the United
States.

In that regard at least, the Colombo flan had been

of political as well as economic importance.
Canada's goal of a stable atmosphere has been made dif
ficult by the American presence in Asia.

While the United

30
Pearson, op.cit.. p.38.
See Appendix III for Canadian
contributions to the Colombo Plan.
31’
/3.3.Fierstead, Canada in World Affairs 1951-1953,
(Toronto;1956) p.208.
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States also had Interests In Asia, these interests would not
always coincide with Canadian aspirations.

As a result there

was a possibility that Oanadian-American relations in general
could deteriorate due to the rather divergent views of Asia
taken by the two countries.

Such a possibility was inherent

in the question of Communist Chinese recognition, which for
the United States, became an important question of prestige,
while for Canada, It was one of the barriers to increased independenoe in foreign policy.
The fall of Nationalist China came as a rude awakening
32
to the American people but not the American government.
Because the idea of monolithic communism was prevalent at that
time, Mao's victory was viewed as another Communist and thus
Soviet expansion.

The fact that the deposed leader, Chiang,

had been supported largely by the United States, made his
collapse even more shocking.
Nationalists'

More than that, however, the

defeat pointed up a great power vacuum as far

as the American government was concerned.

This is not to deny

that the state of China was still powerful in Asia;

but sim

ply that it was now a Communist power instead of one friendly
to the United States.

Previously, American policy had been

predicated on the basis of a friendly, pro-West, China.
Now Chiang was gone, and China's new leader, Mao, proved ex
tremely hostile to the United States.

This fact coupled with

32
See below Chapter #.
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the already crumbling colonial system and the Korean War
forced the United States into more active Asian involvement.
The United States has had a long history of Asian in
volvement in the Philippines, in extensive missionary acti
vity and in substantial assistance programs.

Theodore Roos

evelt had predicted as much in 1901 when he said:
We stand supreme in a continent, in a hemisphere.
East and West we look across two great oceans to
ward the larger world life in which....we must
take an ever-increasing share. 33
Concern for the Russo-Japanese War, the "Gentleman's Agree
ment" and the war in the Pacific,all before 1945, seem to
bear out Roosevelt's feelings.

After 1945 the l6 billion

dollars netted out in assistance to Asian countries show a
34
continuing Interest in that continent.
Significantly,
however, America's Asian involvement during these years
tried to divorce itself from appearing to perpetuate the
colonial system.

Chiang's imminent collapse, however, made

this pretended aloofness impossible, and the United States
became more active in that civil war from 1946 to 1949.

It

was not until 1950 that the United States containment policy

33
Cited in Jules David's,
Time, (Hew York:i960) p.3.

America and the World of Our

34
See Appendix Iv. These figures indicate that while
American private investment in Asia was not significant until
i9 6 0 , the record of official government loans and assistance
was.
Thus It appears that the American government,if not the
private investor, had a growing interest in Asia after 1937
and especially since 1958. See also China White Paper, o p .
c i t . p . 1006- 1053, esp. pp.1043-1044.
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per ee became committed to Asia, occasioned by the outbreak
of the Korean War.
It would be in light of the above, then, that OanadianAmerican relations in Asia were to be conducted.

Import

antly, even in the early stages of involvement, the United
States had always had a great deal more at stake in Asia,
since she was a world power more by right and less by trans
ient circumstance than Canada.
ests

The latter, while her inter

were not minimal did not, and still does not, have as

much at stake.

The Korean War served as the first test of
35
Oanadian-American mutual involvement in Asia,
signalling

a Canadian response to American initiatives that would be
typical of her future Asian involvements.

This was basic

ally Canada's refusal to be committed entirely to American
policy, and in that measure sacrifice what she considered
indispensible policy objectives.

35
While the question of Communist Chinese recognition was
chronologically first, its effect on Oanadian-American in
terplay must be seen over a longer period of time, and will
be dealt with in Chapter 5.
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Ill
CANADA, TEE UNITED STATES AND TEE
KOREAN QUESTION 1945-1951

1
"Korea has been an Ill-fated peninsula,"

Its checker

ed history has known domination by the Tartars, Mongols,
Japanese and Manchus periodically until the seventeenth cen-

2
tury.

In the twentieth century it has been the pawn of

Japan, the Soviet Union and, more recently, the United Sta
tes.

Lying in the heart of the Far East, the peninsula has

been called the dagger pointed at the heart of Japan, and for
this reason became a part of the developing Japanese Empire,
later to be known as the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Korea's plight, never an enviable one, was worsened at the
close of World War II,
The post-war problems of Korea, like so many of the other
nations of Asia, were the result of Japan's unconditional
3
surrender and the confused end of World War II,
Trapped
between the great Asian powers of China, Japan and Russia,
the peninsula had obvious strategic importance in Asia speci-

1
Wilcox, op.cit.. p.44.

2
Shannon McCune,
"The United States and Korea", in W.
Thorpe ed.. The United States and the Far Eas t. (Englewood
Cliffs, N . J . ;1^52) P.t4-9t, P .7?.
Wilcox, op.cit., p.44 .

247606

25

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
fically, but also to the world.

Thus, the Cairo Declaration

of 1 9 4 3 , signed by the Great Powers in anticipation of Japan's

fall and mindful of Korea's long domination, agreed that "in
4
due Course (she) shall become free and independent."
Con
sequently, Stalin and Roosevelt considered that the country
could appropriately be administered by a multi-powered trus
teeship in preparation for a future of full independence.
"The terms of the trusteeship or even the immediate future
5
of Korea occupied the statesmen but little",
thus the for
mula for independence was not worked out at this time.

With

the Japanese surrender in 1945, Korea once again became pro
minent .
It should be remembered here that the Korean question
did not warrant as much concern from the great powers as did
the larger question of Japan's defeat.

Moreover, the United

States, and Canada, had both felt that the European theater
of war was more important than the Pacific, and to that ex
tent were immediately concerned with the German front.

Only

when the war in Europe was close to an end did the United
States make a full turn to the East.
Canada, to the extent that she participated in the Paci
fic Theater, was mainly concerned with a resumption of
4
McCune, op.cit., p.76.
5
L. Gordenker,
Hague, 1 9 5 9 , p.3.

The Peaceful Unification of Korea.
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6
Japanese trade.

Thus, at the close of the war she was more

interested in an equitable Japanese Peace Treaty to further
that end, than in the Korean issue to which she was not even
a party.

From the beginning, then, it was apparent that Korea

would theoretically occupy a more important place in American
policy than in Canadian.

This fact runs through the entire

Korean issue, and it is well to note it now, for at no time
was Canada proportionately as involved, committed, or inter
ested in the Korean War per se than was the United States.
Logically, the end of World War II should have been the
occasion for implementing theTCàlro Declaration.

The accep

tance of Japan's surrender, however, took priority.

It was

at this point that the division of Korea along the thirtyeighth parallel was effected by Soviet and American troops,
apparently for convenience and efficiency.

7

At this time

the Korean people were "assured that the purpose of the oc
cupation was to enforce the instrument of surrender and to
protect them in their personal and religious rights."^

The

question of independence, however, was further clouded by
the occupation forces until December, 1945 when the matter

6
See above Chapter II and Appendix Ib.
See also Lower
op.cit.. Chapter 5, and Angus op.cit.. Chapter 4, 6 and 7.
7
Thorpe, op.cit.. p.78.

8
Gordenker, op.cit.. p.4.
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was taken up at a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow.
It was here that the two occupying powers attempted to work
out not only a solution to Korean independence, but to the
resultant unification problem as well.

Towards this end,

the United States and the U.S.S.E. set up a Joint Commission
for Korean settlement.

Russian stubbornness, however, and

an American reluctance to make use of her superior military
power combined to bring the matter before the United Nations.
According to American Ambassador Lovett, the United States
"did not want to have the inability of two powers to reach
agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims
of the Korean people to independence."^
The United Nations struck hopeful aspirations from both
the United States and Canada.

It is useful here to see how

both countries viewed the then still-:'-infant'!

body for a bet

ter understanding of events that follow.
There were few countries that had more reason than Ca
nada to appreciate the "inseparable connection between in
ternational organizations and (her) national interest.
Her difficult geographical position has already been mentioned,
and this, along with her aversion to war, wase instrumental in
9
Ibid. p.l4.
10

ions.

E.H. Soward and E. Mclnnis, Canada and the United Nat
(New York:1956) p.VII.
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directing her to the United Nations,

St, Laurent himself,

in 1947, had said that "the best hope for mankind lies in
the establishment of a world organization for the malntainance of p e a c e , a n d
tate policy there.

it was this pursuit which was to dic

She looked to the United Nations as an

instrument through which nations could cooperate to remove
dangers of war and establish an orderly and peaceful communlty.

12

Indeed, the early post-war years seemed to nece

ssitate such cooperation since there was a greater need,
through diplomacy, to reach a "modus vivendi with the Communists."

13

Aside from this there were other reasons why

Canada sought an effective world forum.
By 1948, Canada "was forced to realize that only oc
casionally could her voice be influential in detailing mat14
ters of grand policy."
This was made even more evident
when she considered the effect of living next to the most
powerful nation in the world.

Thus, for Canada to attempt an

independent approach to foreign policy, it was necessary to
mitigate somewhat the overpowering influence of the United
11

Ibid. p.98.
12
I b i d . p.212.
13
Documents on the Korean Crisis. (Ottawa ;1951) p.9.
Hereafter referred to as Documents. 1951.
14
Spencer, op.cit.. p.9.
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States,

In the United Nations, theoretically if not funct

ionally, Canada had an equal voice in world affairs.

Simi

larly, this voice would, to some degree, establish that
Canada pursued her own foreign policy, rather than simply
mimicking United States policy.

Moreover, she knew she could

not go it alone in any world crisis.

The bald fact was, that

for Canada, no major action was possible "if it did not have
the support of those who held the major share of the world's
15
military and economic power."
There was a need for interna
tional cooperation with the nations that mattered - the su
perpowers.

There was little point in Canada taking unlimited

action if those who had to carry the major portion of that
16
action were not in sympathy.
She felt, moreover, that se
curity lay in a firm structure of international organization.
In addition to the above, Canada accepted as a matter of
course that war-time growth in power and stature (real or
assumed)

"required participation in the new international

order which was being constructed with the United Nations as
17
a pivot."
During the war Canada was content to be accept
ed as a major participant, "without being required to under-

15
Statements and Speeches, No.47/2, January 13, 1947, p.8,
Hereafter referred to as S/S.
16
Spencer, op.cit., p.7.
17
Ibid. p.2.
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take In the responsibility of sharing in the determination
18
of grand policy."
Now all that had changed, and Canada,
from pride, concern, and Interest, felt she should at least
be a current in the stream of global affairs,

for these rea

sons, then, Canada both sought and valued United Nations mem
bership.
Although there was no basic Oanadian-American divergence
on United Nations' usefulness, the United States seemed to
view that body differently.

Collective security, while in

principle extremely important for United States policy, was
not the only advantage of the United Nations.

A more hope

ful consequence of membership would be the lightening

of the

burden of American responsibility in global affairs.

In con

cert with other nations, American action in the United Nations
would lend a moral justification to United States policy.

The

fact that submergence in an aggregate of nations would remove,
to a certain degree, the opportunity for unilateral American
action that was needed in the post-war years largely did not
matter.

Indeed, the idea that initiative itself was necessary

was not then prominent.
These were the main Canadian and American concepts of the
United Nations as formulated in 1945 and immediately after.
The decision to bring the Korean deadlock before

that body

brought many of those concepts into play.

18
Ibid, p.2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
At this point it may be well to remember that just as the
Korean issue itself meant more to the United States than it
did to Canada, the basic concept of the United Nations meant
much more to Canada than to the United States,

The United

States post-war position was fairly well grounded upon econo
mic and military realities and was, therefore, much less dep
endent upon outside circumstances than that of Canada.

All

this had the effect of continually placing Canada in a posi
tion where she would have to prove herself in the world community.

Thus, with the emergence of a re-vitalized Europe,

Canada found herself in a more tenuous power position.

More-

over, because of the heightened volatility of the world situa
tion due to Russia's, and much later China's, aquisition of
nuclear weapons, Canada found herself drawn closer to the
United Nations, and in utilizing that forum to encourage peace.
The United States, it would seem, became increasingly disen
chanted with the United Nations as she rose to the status of
super-power.

The situation would evolve, then, to a greater

desire on Canada's part to uphold United Nations principles,
while simultaneously trying to make American policy conform
to world peace in general.

In a word, the long time Canadian

opportunity to influence the United States was now accompanied
by a greater sense of responsibility for doing so.

This ree-

sponsibility was especially evident in the Korean situation.
Because of the American and Soviet deadlock, the thirtyeighth parallel evolved "from a line of military occupation to
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an artificial barrier to political and economic unity.
It was the task of the United Nations to try to ameliorate
this division and "in due course" ensure the independence of
Korea.

In the General Assembly, the United States introduced

a resolution to establish a United Nations Temporary Commis
sion on Korea (UNTCOK) designed to "facilitate and expedite
a program for the attainment of national independence (for)
Korea and (the) withdrawal of occupation forces."

20

The ve

hicle for this program was to be universal elections in Korea
(observed by UNTOOK) which would unify the country and arran
ge for troop withdrawal.

The United States also took the

liberty of naming the members to the Commission, of which
Canada was one.

21

This was done, moreover, without prior

consultation with many of the proposed members and Leon Gord
enker suggests that "at least two delegations were taken by

22
surprise when (the American delegate) read his list."
Canada was one, but Gordenker adds that she did not reject
the invitation out of hand apparently to save the United States
19
Ibid, p.89.

20
Debates, 1949, Vol.II, p.l604-l605.
21
The others were Australia, China, France, El Salvador,
India, The Philippines, Syria and the Ukranian SSR.

22
Gordenker, op.cit.. p.3l .
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embarrassment.
This American action is rather significant in OanadianAmerican relations.

It suggests that the United States was

firmly convinced that, besides being sympathetic on the Korean
issue, Canada could be relied upon to take a view close to
that of the United States in the matter.

Indeed, the whole

commission was set up so that "a majority of its members could
be expected to favor or at least not sharply oppose United
24
States policy."
The United States had, to a great degree,
taken Canada for granted In naming her to the commission.
This action was not wholly based on unwarranted assump^
tiens, however.

A combined war effort, similar cultural and

historical heritages, and close policy outlooks regarding the
Communist threat were all prevalent.

Their broad policies

were also similar regarding the need for security and peace
in volatile areas.

The only difference was that the United

States overestimated the extent to which it could go regard
ing Canadian action.

The notion that because ultimate policy

aims were similar, agreement on tactics would necessarily
follow proved to be false.

The Canadian feeling that the

United Nations was too important a body to be made into a
super-power play was underestimated.

Because of this mistaken

23
Ib i d . p.31.
24
Ibid. p.31.
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assumption an understanding of future Canadian positions would
be difficult.
What was also apparent in the choice of Canada was the
lack of diplomatic skill on the part of the United States.
What may have been condoned in the backrooms of Yalta and
Potsdam could not be considered useful when dealing in an
open world forum like the United Nations.

What may have been

expedient in dealings with South American "puppet" regimes,
conceivably would not be correct when dealing with a country
which at that time fancied herself as a prominent power.
This stroke, understandable as it was in view of the limited
American diplomatic activity, was obviously an extension of in
tracontinental diplomacy onto an international level.

While

this nomination had a certain grounding in logic, similar
American moves in the future would not prove as expedient.
This time, however, Canada was not averse to membership on
UNTOOK.
Canada, although diplomatically snubbed, looked upon
UNTCOK membership both as an opportunity to try to influence
the course of the United Nations and to mitigate tension in
a potential trouble spot.

She would also be taking an active

part in the United Nations and to that extent be furthering
her goal of implementing a successful international organiza
tion.

Another element in her decision was the fact that

Canada, being ultimately dependent upon the United States,
did in fact want to please her.

In reality, membership on
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the commission was not such a hitter pill to swallow, and it
could be valuable.

In a word, it was just as easy as not to

accept UNTOOK membership.

That is what Canada did although

she, like most other countries, was ignorant as to how far
the situation would go.
The idea of a temporary commission to study and advise
on the possibility of elections in Korea was accepted by most
of the United Nations membership with the exception of Russia
and the Soviet bloc countries.

The very existence of a com-

mlssion suggests that the United Nations had "developed a
special political instrument for use in troubled areas where
solutions are elusive but where the danger of spreading confllct is never distant.

..25

Pearson himself had said that the

"expression of the Korean people for unity, on which (the

26
General Assembly) agrees, does not seem to be necessary."
The root of the problem, however, proved to be the difflculty of the commission's access to North Korea.

American

military officials were more in sympathy with UNTCOK's work,
obviously because it was American sponsored.

The Soviets,

however, had advocated complete military withdrawal prior to
any elections and thus would not support the commission's
aims.

Indeed, even the Ukranian SSR had refused to serve

25
Ibid. p.VII.

26
Spencer, op.cit.. p.90.
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on UNTCOK.

Moreover, formulas for "democratic" elections

were ostensibly different in the American and Russian views.
Russian uncooperativeness was, in the final analysis, the
main reason why the United States sponsored a second reso
lution calling for supervision of elections in Korea in such
areas as were assessable to it.

It was this second resolu-

?7
tion which brought Canadian action.“
The second resolution, though reasonable from the Ameri
can point of view, was not endorsed initially by Canada.
Her reasons, put forth by St. Laurent, were substantial and
were based on legal as well as political grounds.
By virtue of the second resolution, the Temporary Com
mission had been authorized to supervise elections in the
whole of Korea but "was not authorized to act in the South
26
alone."
The Interim Committee’s decision to "implement
29
the program in such areas as are accessable to it,"
would,

27
The American decision calling for the second resolution
was also conditioned by other factors.
One was the war-weary
attitude of the American people.
Cries of "bring the boys
home" were prevalent during much of the Commission's work.
Also, the fact that support of troops in South Korea, as well
as of the government itself, proved to be such an expensive
proposition that it tended to convince the American government
that it was in their best interests to facilitate a quick set
tlement of the Korean question.

28
Debates, 1948, p.1075-1076.
29
Ibid. p.1075-10 7 6 . The Interim Committee was a body set
up to do the work of the General Assembly since the latter
was too unwieldy for continuous consultation.
As will be seen,
the Committee itself proved to be a point of friction for the
Canadian Delegation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38
according to St, Laurent, be overstepping the bounds of the
commission's authority.

Its action could not, therefore,

"be

brought within the terms of reference....as laid down by the
General Assembly."

Thus, said St. Laurent, UNTCOK was not

empowered to act in the South alone.

Nor could the Interim

Committee itself change the terms of reference.

Indeed,

such a change could only be effected by the General Assembly.
In this vein, election supervision in the South was illegal.
The question involved more than legalities, however, in that
there were also political considerations.
While the constitutional repercussions of the second
Resolution were significant, the Canadian delegation also
"appreciated the fact that Korea was a danger spot and that
to hold elections in the South alone would amount, in fact,
31
to a partition.
Such an election would, moreover, institu
tionalize the decision in Korea to such an extent that ulti
mate unification would prove impossible.
also create ^
United Nations.

The division would

facto a government under the wardship of the
Such a situation would, it was felt, " i n - -

volve the organization in police or administrative commitments
which the United Nations could not fulfill in the absence of
32
military force" — a military force which Canada at that

30
I b i d . p.2075-2076.

X

31
Spencer, op.cit.. p.105-111.
32
Ibid, p.111.
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time did not believe advantageous.
For Canada, the Implications of the Second resolution
were great.

They would, in effect, remove the responsibili

ty of the United States occupation and place it in the hands
of the United Nations.

More than any other power which was

willing to deal with Korea through the United Nations, the
United States had direct involvement there —

basically the

United States program was to shake off those ties.

33

If

this was in fact the United States’ intention it would seem
to bear out Canadian fears about the United Nations becoming
a tool of the superpowers.

While Canada’s attitude would at

least silence Russian allégations that UNTCOK was in the ser
vice of the United States, attitude alone would not alleviate
34
the situation.
The Korean issue in the United Nations boiled down to a
question of the Interim Committed^ reaction to the United
35
States ëecond resolution.
If, as Pearson suggested,
it
should be taken as advice, then it would be just a matter of
time before the matter could conceivably be worked out in the

33
Gordenker, opScit.. p.84.
34
Ibid, p.73. For St. Laurent’s and Pearson’is views see
Harrison, op.cit.. Chapters 7 and 8.
55

See Denis Stairs,
’Confronting Uncle Sam; Cuba and
Korea", in Clarkson, op.cit.. p.57-68.
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General Assembly.

However, if the Committee accepted the

■second resolution without question there would be, in St.
Laurent's words, "a new and serious situation created which
would have to be taken into consideration by the governments
who are members of the Commission, and who feel that the ad36
vice from this Committee is unwise and unconstitutional."
Denis Stairs suggests that if "this was a threat that Canada
would withdraw from UNTCOK if the Americans had their way,
then in terms of the usual Canadian subservience it was a
37
bold stroke indeed."
However, the threat, if it was one,
proved to be unheeded.
The Canadian insistence in maintaining the formal machi
nery of a duly constituted United Nations organ was the overt
expression of her high aspirations for the organization it
self.

Basically what she saw in Korea was a potentially dan

gerous situation which could only be exacerbated by the im
plementation of the Second Resolution.

Her insistence on the

formal machinery, then, was a public attempt to influence
American policy in the United Nations.

As will be seen, this

attempt was largely unsuccessful but that failure did serve
to reinforce her faith in quiet diplomacy.
On the Korean issue in the United Nations and later when

36

Debates, 1948, p.1075.
37

Stairs, op.cit. . p.65.
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hostilities broke out, it was apparent that open diplomacy,
on a question about which the United States was truculent,
was largely useless.

This lesson seems to have been learned

in view of Canadian action concerning Vietnam and on the
Chinese recognition question.

Hereafter only when there was

imminent world danger would Canada voice her critical con
cern about United States policy.

As will be seen, vocifer

ous Canadian reaction to United States policy would serve only
to embarrass Canada.

Outspoken concern would be expressed,

therefore, only on issues that were immediate and potentially
dangerous, while quiet diplomacy would be used mainly on
issues that were of relatively minor importance, or in cases
where a loss of face far outweighed positive benefits.

This

is not to say that quiet diplomacy would never be used on
major issues, but that when it was, it was usually accompanied by a major Canadian policy statement for public consumption, which served to lend gravity to Canada’s position.
When the Interim Committee met, Patterson, the Canadian
representative, had already been advised by his government
"not to accept the advice given in the Becond resolution or
associate himself with the election....in South Korea alone."

38

However, Patterson was not present at the meeting when the
decision was taken to implement the Second Resolution.

That

decision touched-off an already sensitive Canadian government.

38
Debates 1948, p.1075-1076.
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"If the commission were to proceed in this matter",
said St. Laurent, "its impartiality and authority as a pro39
perly constituted commission would he undermined,"
The
overtones of the decision to implement the resolution indeed
seemed lugubrious.

The reasoning for such a decision was

anything but constitutional, especially since it had come so
soon after receiving word from the Interim Committee.

In the

words of the Secretary to UNTCOK,
The two main reasons for making the announcement
as soon as possible were firstly that it was desireable to avoid delay concerning a final date
for the election, and secondly that a public an
nouncement of some sort (was) expected in connection with the celebration of the Korean indepen
dence day on the first of March.
It was hoped
that the public announcement from the commission
might have a quieting effect on threatening riots.

40

When informed of this, Patterson "regretted that the tempora
ry commission had made a number of public statements to the
effect that it had made up its mind (concerning the elec-^
41
tlonâ).
Indeed, General Hodge, Military commander of the
occupation in the South, had said that the elections had been
cleared with the proper authorities.

However, in Patterson’s

view, the commission’s vote was not legal and Hodge’s state
ments were

"either misleading or based on a misunderstand-

39
I b i d . 1948, p.2452-2453.
40
Gordenker, op.cit.. p.76.
41
I b i d , p.77. See also Stairs, op.cit., p.64-68.
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Ing.”

When the commission could not clarify the state

ments made by Hodge, Patterson temporarily walked out.

When

a formal vote was taken upon his return, an official state
ment, issued by the commission, declared that they were still
considering action on Implementing the second resolution.
By this action it would seem that temporarily at least Cana
da had won, and that her cry of "foul" was heard in Washington,
This exchange between an obviously American dominated commis
sion and the Canadian Delegation was significant because it
pointed up the degree to which Canada was able to influence
the United States.

The results can be misleading, however.

The Korean affair in the United Dations suggests the
modifying influence of Canada upon the United States.

Un

able to ostensibly alter grand American policy, Canada chose
to influence it in in a legal manner.

While the change would

admittedly be minor, it did serve to illustrate Canadian
stubbornness.

Canada obviously did feel that larger issues

were at stake, but only on this point could she get her way.
Quiet diplomacy here was not enough and, to emphasize what
she felt were significant implications for future United
Dations policy, she came out publicly and criticized the
commission's proposed actions.
The United States reaction was also significant,
did have a point and it was a valid one.

Canada

In this sense it

42
Gordenker, op.oit., p.77.
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is not too much to placate a friend over something that really
was never in very much doubt.

Basically, there was no point

in alienating Canada over an issue which would ultimately go
your own way.

While a compliance to Canadian demands would

not affect the whole scope of Korean activity in the United
Dations, it did seem to be a point on which Canada was ada«.
maht. American stubbornness, moreover, might look as though
the United States was trying to run roughshod over a United
Dations commission.

In this light one could easily concede

Canada the battle knowing one would win the war.

It was,

however, another Instance of American brashness and lack of
tact, although it did point up the Canadian response to an
American policy which she felt unwise.

In the end, however,

Canada’s "victory" was short-lived and the "unconstitutional"
decision was legally formalized.

The American government was

firm on the important issue of having elections, if not on
the less important formula for effecting them.
Since formal procedures were followed on ÜKTCOK, Canada
had made headway.

Ultimately, however, she had not been able

to influence American policy in the United Dations.

It was

doubtful that anyone at this time could have prevented the
United States from extricating itself from Korea,

The occu

pation itself had proved troublesome from the beginning, dlf43
ficult to supply and strategically questionable."
There

43
Loo, cit.. p.87.
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was also the possibility that there might be skirmishes with
the Russians;
ous overtones.

a possibility that was pregnant with dangerIn a word, the United States was determined

to get out of Korea.

With Canada’s consent or without it,

this is what she did.

Canada’s action had the tangible re

sult of adding legality to that predetermination.
Although she had been snubbed, Canada was not about to
bite off her nose to spite her face.

Her interests and po

sition in the United Nations conceivably took precedence over
diplomatic setbacks, and to that extent Canada took part in
44
the commission's activity.
It was obvious that even though
UNTOOK had practically abandoned the aim of unification bef
ore or through a national election, Canada had not lost all
hope.

She would, by continuing to serve on it make the best

of an admittedly bad situation.
were justified.

Her initial fears however

Doubtless the thirty-eighth parallel had

been institutionalized.

With the outbreak of the Korean War,

this political border became a military one as w e l l ,
The foregoing discussion of Canadian-Amerlean activity
in the United Nations has shown how far Canada would go once

44
The difficulty on the commission, however, seems to have
made Canada somewhat hesitant about robust service.
Thus, when
the Ukranian SSR chose to step down from UNTOOK because of the
decision to go ahead with elections in the South, Canada took
this opportunity to do the same, saying that she did not want
to offset the commission’s balance. See Gordenker, ibid, p,70138, also Stairs, op,c i t .. p,65-68 and Harrison, op.c i t ..
p.1 11 ,
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she knew the trend of American policy.

The fact that she ran

directly counter to dhat policy proved she would go to some
lengths in situations that were of potential but not immed
iate danger.

In the end she followed American policy, even

though she had been overruled by American domestic consider
ations, notably a Presidential election.

Canadian action

during the Korean War, however, was taken not for fear of potential danger but immediate danger —

in that situation

Canada was considerably more vehement.
The Korean War for the United States served as the first
test of a European orientated containment policy, as well as
America's introduction to the limited war.

From the develop

ment of the Atomic bomb, until Korea, "American foreign po
licy was based on the assumption that any war would be a to45
tal war waged largely with nuclear weapons."
However, the
dismissal of one of America's greatest war heroes in MacArthur
and the overwhelming defeat of the Democrats in 1952 suggest
that the United States was unprepared for Korea and the limited war.
For Canada, too, Korea was significant.

She had, for the

first time committed her forces to the United Nations in what
would prove to be peacekeeping operations.

These operations,

moreover, were to serve a double purpose; alleviation of hos
tilities and upholding the authority of the United Nations,

45
A.
Gutteman,
(Boston;1967) p.1.

Korea and the Theory of Limited W a r .
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With this in mind we must view Canada’s action in an Ameri
can dominated Korean War as a gauge of how much support she
would give United States policy in a conflict that drew many
countries close to the brink of World War III.
In an important speech before the National Press Club
then Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined the Par Eastern
Missing from that
46
perimeter were Korea and the island of Taiwan,
"So far as

defense perimeter of the United States,

the military security of these areas are concerned," said
Acheson,
it must be clear that no person can guarantee
these areas against military attack.
But it
must (also) be clear that no guarantee is hard
ly sensible or necessary within the realm of
practical relationship.
"Should such an attack occur," he went on,

the initial reliance must be on the people at
tacked to resist it and then upon the commit
ments of the entire civilized world under the
Charter of the United Nations (to resist it). 47
While Acheson’s remarks were also concerned with the
Chinese civil war, his statement did give the impression that
the defense of South Korea would be up to the South Koreans
themselves.

Failing this, the responsibility would then be

assumed by the United Nations,
Because the United Nations had chartered South Korea, it
was reasonable to assume that it should come to Korea’s de46
See below Chapter §.
47
Guttman, op.cit,. p.111-118.
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fenae,If It became necessary.

This rationale was, In effect

the same shared by Canada, which, for the reasons cited above,
had been fearful of just such a situation.

What proved to be

Canadian providence was borne out when, in June 1950, North
Korea

attacked and overwhelmed a lightly manned South Korean

army.

Acheson's statement, provident or not, was similarly

borne out by subsequent United Nations action.
The United States, by 1950, bad taken measures to drastically reduce the American military establishment in Korea,
in addition to the rest of the area generally.

Indeed "Japan

was garrisoned by a skeleton force of four divisions and
these....were reduced to 70^ of strength by defense econo*
49
mies."
Korea itself, moreover, in a measure to assure that
"(they) might not be tempted to embarrass Washington by a
march northwards, were given little in the way of military

.50

aid,"

Small wonder then, with obvious military inferiority

and what seemed a tacit refusal of American support. South
Korea was attacked.

The American government, however, in

spite of previous pronouncements, chose to defend the South
Korean government.
48
See above p, 38-41,
49
G, Hudson,
The Hard and Bitter Peace. (New York:1967)
p.8 1 , "To prevent the South Koreans from attacking" said Gen
eral Roberts,"we gave them no combat air force or tanks or
heavy artillery." Same, p. 8 l,
50
Ibid, p.8 1 ,
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49
The United Nations Security Council, at the behest of
the United States, issued a June 25 resolution calling "upon
the invading troops to cease hostilities and withdraw back
„51
to the thirty-eighth parallel.
Two days later, the Coun
cil issued another resolution recommending that the members
of the United Nations "furnish such assistance to the Bepu-

52
bllc of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack."
With these two resolutions the Korean War became, in addition
to a United States problem, one for the United Nations.

The

significance of this action cannot be overestimated.
Because the United Nations had assisted in the creation
of the new republic, and had kept its commission in Korea at
the request of Syngman Ehee, this act of North Korean aggres
sion could be construed as a challenge to the organization
itself.

The North Korean attack had turned the United Na

tions from an exponent of collective security to an actor in
collective security.

United States interests there were also

in jeopardy as were those of Canada,

The latter obviously

did not want to see a war in Asia, but she did not want to
see the work and the ideals of the United Nations compromised
either.

Accordingly, Canada found herself committed both in

principle and, later militarily, to war-like action in Korea,
under the auspices of the United Nations,

51
B. Rees, K o r e a . The Limited W a r , (London:1964), p,110114.

52
Guttman, op.cit.. p.1-9.
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At this point Canada was in agreement with both the ac
tion of the United Nations and initial American policy.
Truman, on June 25, had sent the Seventh Fleet to patrol the
Formosa Strait to prevent a possible extension of the hos*
t m t i e s to that island.

He was certain, moreover, that if

South Korea were allowed to fall, communist leaders would then
be emboldened to override nations closer to the United States,
and quite possibly draw the world into another war.
done prior to the first Security Council Resolution.

This was
However,

acting on the justification of the second resolution, Truman
authorized General MacArthur, "to send to Korea combat units
54
drawn from the American army of occupation in Japan.
With
that action the United States unilaterally entered the war
before the United Nations could muster the wherewithal to implement the second Security Council Resolution.

Canada was

in agreement with these policies since, said Pearson, they
"represented collective action through the United Nations for
55
peace."
At this stage Canada felt American and United Na
tions policy complementary, and did not object to the United
Sta te s’ move:

indeed, Pearson defended it.

53
Harry Truman, Memoirs Vol.II Years of Trial and Hop e.
(New York:1956) p,333.
54
Guttman, op.cit.. p.1-9.
55
Documents, 1951, p.9.
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At this point it must be remembered that Canada looked
at the Korean War on June 17, 1950 purely in terms of de
fense action.

Even though there were hostilities there was

no fear that the war would be expanded.

Agreement with Uni

ted States policy was entirely justifiable, in terms of re
ference of the war.

This attitude changed, as we shall see

later upon China's entrance, but it is well to note that the
situation in late June of 1950 in no way resenbled the situation when China entered the war.
"An act of aggression," said Pearson,

"will be met by

the dispatch of forces put at the disposal of the Security
Council by member governments as the result of prior agree56
ments."
However, he continued,
because agreement (on the forces to be put at the
disposal of the Council) had proved technically
impossible, the responsibility for checking ag
gression had to be shouldered by individual mem
bers of the Council acting within the terms of
the Charter but on their own initiative.
57
Significantly, Canadian approval had been given in terms of
United Nations action, and not as an endorsement of American
policy per s e. This aspect would come into play later during
MacArthur'8 push to the Yalu when, again with reference to
the United Nations, Canada grew wary of American military
leadership,
Canada's official reaction to the Korean hostilities
56
Cited in Ibid, p,9.
57
Ibid. p.9-10.
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has been expressed by Lester Pearson,

Although she could

not be expected to play as Important a role as the United
States, yet Canada's job was
to play a part, a part determined by herself
but worked out in consultation with (her)
friends in the collective efforts of the free
countries to prevent aggression if possible
by showing that it cannot succeed, or to pre
vent it if it does.
58
Pearson's statement had a twofold effect.

He was re

emphasizing the limited objectives of the war, and stressing
the need for consultation among United Nations participants.
Such consultation was to prove necessary for, in less than
two months, the first half of the General Assembly resolu
tion had been accomplished;

the invader had been repulsed.

The question now was whether

to cross

the thirty-eighth par

allel and, if so, the extent

to which

the aggressor should

be pursued.
The Canadian attitude, upon completion of the first half
of the General Assembly Resolution, indicated an agreement
with United Nations proposals to push across the thirtyeighth parallel.

Speaking in the United Nations, Pearson

expressed the hope that North Korea would lay down their arms,
thus curtailing any more open conflict.

If they did not do

this, however, the United Nations should
leave its forces free to do whatever is prac
ticable to make certain that the communist ag58
Harrison, op.cit.. p.282.
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gressors of North Korea are not permitted to
establish some new base In the peninsula from
which they could sally forth again upon a
peaceful people.
59
In this respect the Canadian attitude was similar to that of
MacArthur, who felt that a foray into North Korea was a sine
qua non for complete victory.

Canada did have reservations

about the crossing, however.
"Nothing should be done", said Pearson in the establish
ment of a unified free Korea which carries any menace to
60
K o r e a ’s neighbors."
Nothing must be done (he added) which holds
the least suggestion that any member of the
United Nations has any purpose in Korea other
than to establish that country under the full
sovereignty of its own people.
61
It was obvious that the crossing of the thirty-eighth paral
lel had political as well as military significance for Canada
even at this early stage.

Indeed,Canada had even "proposed

sending a mission which would have been the last appeal to
the North Koreans (to surrender) before the line (was) cros62
sed."
Similarly, endorsement of the United Nations authori59
Documents,

1952, p.2,

60
Ibi'd. p^3.
61
Ibid. p.3.

62
Debates, 1951, p. 1442-1444.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54
zation to cross the parallel was given only after Canada was
convinced such a move "might not result in a rush for the
Manchurian or Russian border."

To further lessen the ten

sion conducive to a Chinese entrance, the Canadian govern
ment had even proposed a defensive line across the narrow
waist of North Korea to serve as a "kind of unoccunied fron64
tier area."
In a word, the Canadian government, though in
basic agreement with the first crossing, "felt that very
great care should be taken to avoid offering any unecessary
65
provocation to the Chinese government at Peking."
The single most important unknown factor in the first
crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel was the attitude of
Peking.

The enigma was solved when Communist China crossed

the Yalu.

By their action, it was obvious that, the crossing

of the thirty-eighth parallel and the steady advancement of
United Nations forces to the Chinese border

was considered

by Mao to be a threat to China’s security.
It is important to note, however, that during the United
Nations decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel, the
Chinese government had made their views known.

Chou En-lai

had said, on September 30, 1950, that the "Chinese people,...

63
Ibid. 1951, p.1442-1444.
64
Ibid. 1951, p.55.
65
Ibid. 1951, p.55.
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will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being sa-

66
vagely Invaded by the Imperialists,"

Moreover, on October

2, he had formally notified the Indian Ambassador, K.M.
Panikkar that,

"American intrusion into North Korea would en67
counter Chinese resistance,"
This attitude must have been
in Pearson’s mind as he warned against provoking the Chinese,

The Ottawa-New Delhi link was apparently utilized on this oc
casion even though Canada ultimately acquiesed to United
States policy.

The American government, however, did not take

Panikkar seriously.
Truman, writing of the incident in his "Memoirs" felt
that
Mr, Panikkar had in the past played the game of
the Chinese Communists (so) regularly
that
his warning could not be taken as that of an
observer.
68
The United States was also convinced that the Chinese warning was merely a ploy to prevent the United Nations autho
rization to cross the parallel, possibly hoping to blackmail
69
it by threatening intervention.
There was, moreover, con
tinuing domestic pressure to extend the war and accept nothing

66
A.S. Waiting, China Crosses the Y a l u .
i9 6 0 ) p.93.

Santa Monica;

67
Ibid, p. 1 9 0 .

68
Truman, op.cit.. p.362.
69
Ibid. p. 3 6 2 .
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less than total victory.

The popularity of General Mac

Arthur was evident in this, in addition to a revitalized
Republican Party which was continually criticizing the lim
ited war.
It is apparent in Canadian activity, at this time that
although there was a danger of Chinese entrance, it was not
considered so imminent that Canada should disavow either the
United Nations resolution or the American government’s desire
to cross the thirty-eighth parallel.

It was likely that she

was also thinking about the original United Nations desire
to see a free and independent Korea, once again unified.

As

long as this objective was compatible with United Nation and
American desires, it was a proper course for Canada to follow
also, even though New Delhi had cautioned against it.

Basic

ally, there was a justification in endorsing American and
United Nations policy, even if that policy did offer a pos
sibility for Chinese entrance. 'Ifhen Chinese entrance was
forthcoming, however, Korea became "an entirely new war" and
Canada's attitude changed considerably.
The invasion by Chinese troops said Pearson, had pushed
70
Korea to the mouth of a rumbling volcano.
What had origi
nally been latent fears, were now of foremost concern for
Canada.

The risk of a major war "transcended immeasureably

70
Documents, 1952, p.6 0 .
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all other questions,"

and Canada's desire now was for a ce

ssation of hostilities.

It was also apparent that the uni

fication of Korea was not, at this time, as important.

Spea

king in the Commons, Pearson felt that it was not the obliga
tion of the United Nations to unify Korea by force but to "do
72
everything (they could) to bring about that unity."
"At
the moment," he maintained,

"the focus of our hopes and fears

is....to find a solution to the grave and menacing problem
73
that has arisen in Korea,"
That problem was to "do every
thing within the power of statesmanship to prevent the Korean
74
War from becoming a war with China."
In this vein, Canada
pressed for negotiations.
"We should try to begin negotiations with the Chinese Com
munists", asserted Pearson, "If and when the military situation
75
is stabilized."
In his view, "nothing should be left undone
which might conceivably result in an honorable and peaceful
76
settlement in Korea."
Thus, when there appeared to be a
71
Ibid, p,l3,
72
Debates,

1951, p. 1442-1444,

75
Documents, 1952, p . 13.
74
Ibid, p.15.
75
Ibid, p.l6.
76
Ibid, p,16-17.
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military stalemate at the thirty-eighth parallel, Canada
pressed to take advantage of a "kind of cease-fire" and open
77
negotiations.
It was clear that with the Chinese entrance
Canada became deeply concerned about the possibility of World
III.

This concern was heightened by Truman's apparently

casual reference to the use of atomic weapons.
When asked about the possible use of the atomic bomb.
President Truman replied that "there (had) always been active
78
consideration of nuclear weapons."
Pearson, in a nation
wide broadcast, warned that "the fate of the whole world would
79
be jeopardized by such weapons."
The atomic bomb, moreover,
was not just another weapon, but one which was capable of
destroying all life on earth.

He urged that any decision per

taining to its use be taken in concert with allies and not as
a unilateral act.

"The atomic bomb is universally regarded

as the ultimate weapon" concluded Pearson.
80
treated as such."

"It should be

Whether it was Truman's reference to the ultimate weapon,
81
or a combination of a number of other factors,
Korea ceased

77
Debates, 1951, p. 1442-1444.
78
Truman, op.cit.. p.395.
79
Documents, 1952, p.17.

80
Ibid, p.17.

81
The death of Stalin, a new American administration (which
also alluded to use of the bomb) all were factors.
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to be a hot war shortly after January 1952.

Canada's action

during the hostilities was significant,
Canada had accepted, in many respects, the main lines of
United States policy.

It is imnnrt&mtmmhowPveBv'

so usually wit^ g

thmt, ni\ch policy was in agreement

with United Nations a c t i v i t y . ^ She could, almost throughout
the crisis, find a justification for her action in terms other
than American goals.

Thus, to the extent that American po

licy was compatible wilh her own goals she would for the sake
of friendship, as well as interests, go along with these aims
and subsequent means to attain them.

However, it was one

thing to consent to grand policy, but quite another to risk
a ~major w a r .

Thus when the possibility of war wixn China or

the use" oI TrU'clear weapons seemed imminent Canada could not
accede to American policy.

The fact that the United States

was not prepared to go to war with China, while significant,
does not alter the fact that Canada came out strongly oppos
ed to an extension of hostilities beyond Korea,

Basically,

through her action in the Korean hostilities Canada proved
that when the situation demanded it she could express an op
inion of her own regardless of American policy.

This was

also the case in the United Nations before hostilities broke
out, when Canada had refused to allow the United States to
make unilateral policy for the entire organization.

The ex

tent to which Canada was successful was not so much a measure
of American influence, or lack of it, but rather of Canadian
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determination not to see World War III.

It was also this

determination which prompted her action during the Korean
hostilities, and it will he seen again, though somewhat dif
ferently, in the Vietnam situation.
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IV
CANADA, TEE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM
1 9 54-196 6
Canadlan-American interplay in Vietnam has been condi
tioned by four main factors since the Geneva Accords of 1954.
These are Canada’s difficult rolesoon the I08C, her desire for
a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia, direct American mili
tary involvement in Vietnam and the letter’s attitude toward
containment of Communism.

It is around these four areas that

our discussion of Canadian-American interplay will revolve,
since they are the main points of friction and/or coopera
tion between Canada and the United States in Vietnam.

From

this discussion it will be seen that, similar to the Korean
W a r , Canadian policy has been compatible and, at times, complimentary to American policy, but only insofar a s her own
sense of self-interest and security were not visibly threatened.
■ Canada’s role on the lOSO was a direct result of the
Geneva Conference of 1954 on Korea and Indochina.

Basically,

the lose was a three-member commission comprised of India,
Poland and Canada, its main purpose being to supervise both
the implementation of the cease-fire in Indochina, and the
possibility of elections in Vietnam.

Importantly, the com

mission was given the responsibility for such supervision,
61
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but no direct power with which to effect it.
of the 1080 to oversee and advise,

It was the role

but nothing more.

The

combatting parties, France and the Yiet-minh, were largely
on their honor to implement the decisions of the Geneva Con
ventions, most of which pertained to the cessation of hos
tilities.

The main purpose of the Accords, it should be re-

membered. were military in scone and initially dealt little
o , --A +

+\ç, r.

4- ' r-

^

riUii.

4 ,. . ^ , ,

.

ed France an easy way out of an embarrawwi no- war, and for _f.b
Reason were notoriously short-sighted.

Thus, Canada’s ini

tial position on the 1080 offered h<2r little hope of real
izing the expectations of the Geneva Conference, as well as
her own, and a great possibility for less than substantial
participation.

Moreover, she did not at first even expect to

be a part of the conference on Indochina.
It was as a participant in the Korean discussions that
Canada found herself at Geneva, since she had been Involved
in the Korean hostilities.

Because she had had no direct in

volvement in Indochina at the time, Canada was not particu*larly interested in the Indochina settlement.

Her interest

came more by way of a general "desire to prevent the resump1
tion of hostilities in the region," than anything else. Her
1
Pacificus,
"Canada in Indochina", International Jour
nal . (Autumn: 1 9 5 6 ) Vol.II, No.4, p.270-278, p.271.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63
reaction to Indochina was basically the same as her earlier
reaction to Korea in that since 1945 Canada "moved to a franl
recognition that instability anywhere menaced her own in*-

2

tèrests."

This is not to say that Canada's interest in Indo

china was haphazard, but only that it was not as great as
other parties, France, the 7iet-mihh, the United States, who
had more at stake in the Indochina settlement.

Pearson's

policy in 1954 was "to avoid....involvement in any specific
commitments for which the (Canadian) delegation did not have
a mandate.

Thus, it was felt that the Canadian role should

be less than active, but more than disengaged.

Indeed, she

took pains to "avoid any appearance or attitude of indiffer
ence to developments, the consequence of which (should) they
deteriorate into conflict, would certainly concern and (maybe)
4
involve Canada."
Canada's role evolved, therefore, as "an unobstrusive
5
oil-can
in the proceedings, owing in large part to the es
teem in which the Canadian delegation was held.

Pearson, it

seems, "was highly respected and on good terms with Bedell

2
Ibi d. p.178.
3
L.B. Pearson, S/8

54/30.

4
J, Holmes, "Geneva;1954," International Journal,
mer; 1967) Vol.22, No.3, p.457-484, p.464.
5
I bi d, p,46l.
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6
Smith, Bidault and even Molotov,"

and "Chester Banning was
7
able to speak (fluently) with Chou En-lai,"
Thus, the rap
port which Canada enjoyed with a wide variety of parties
did as much to ensure Canada's position on the commission as
did the fact that she was a member of the Western Bloc,
other two members were non-aligned and pro-communist.
was, thus, a need for a Western voice on the ICSC.

The
There

Canada's

position was, therefore, a logical one, both for herself and
the United States, even if it had come in a roundabout way.
The work of the commission. Insofar as concerned the
prevention of hostilities, was successful.

However, the

"troika principle - behind the composition of the commission
indicated that Canada was there to protect the interests of

8
the West, or to be more specific, of the United States."
Canada's place on the ICSC, therefore, offered her at once a
potentially useful role in Southeast Asia, but, at the same
time, another area in which her involvement could easily
conflict with United States aspirations.

Membership on the

commission, thus, gave Canada her first direct interest in
Indochina.

6
ly.

The American, French and Russian delegated respective
Ibid. p.46l,
7
Ibid, p.46l.

Ô

.P. Singh, op.cit.. p.125-127.
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Canadian membership ensured "not neutrality but a ju&âlèlal approach—

a willingness to look at the situation and

if necessary, agree with decisions which might be contrary
to the wishes of the South Vietnamese, the French or the
9
Americans,"
Because the Poles, "whose ideology did not per
mit impartiality, supported the other side 100 per cent, Ca
nada was appointed to make sure the (Western) side of the
10
case got a fair hearing."
Her role, therefore, was to be
one of judicial overseer although, after 1963, Canada did ac
tively pursue her own interests there outside the realm of
commission work.

As will be seen, it became increasingly

difficult for Canada to maintain complete objectivity in what
she considered a threat to world security.

Just as in Korea,

when the latent possibility of world war was present though
not imminent, in Vietnam Canada took what must be considered
a pro-American leaning on the commission after 1963.

This

view, however, was combined with a stronger extra-commission
approach that was more of an independent than pro-American
leaning.
Canada's reaction to events in Vietnam would be compatible with her general approach to world security.

Indeed,

even if Canada had no direct commitment, it was conceivable
that she still would have shown concern for developments

9
Holmes, op.cit., p.471.
10
Ibid, p.471.
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there.

"We know from experience," said Pearson, "that just

as local conflicts can become general war, so conditions of
security and stability in any part of the world, would serve
11
the cause of peace everywhere,"
While her role on the com
mission did offer her a chance to serve herself as well, it is
conceivable that .she would have found a way to promote peace
in the area had she not been a member.

This would be an

expression of her general post-war goal of eliminating

hosti*

lity, especially that to which the United States was a party.
This elimination was sought not only because Canada might
become involved, but also to permit conditions for economic
relations with an area hitherto untapped.
This attitude was a part of the rationale for the Colo
mbo Plan, which included Canada.

Generally, Canada's prospe

rity "depended traditionally on a complex Interchange of
12
goods all around the world."
Canada, therefore, had a
vested Interest in the re-establishment of normal trading re13
lations in the greatest possible volume.
Thus, Canada was
interested in facilitating conditions of "political and eco14
nomic security in the Par East,."
as a pre-condition to ex-

11
Pacificus, op.cit.. p.270.
12
Spencer, op.cit.. p.189.
13
Ibid. p.189.
14
Ibid. p.52.
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pansion of her own trade.

These were some of the Canadian

attitudes which must be considered in the context of the
Vietnamese situation from 1954 onward.
A full picture of Canadian-American mutual involvement

in Vietnam cannot be complete without a review of American
Involvement there since approximately 1950.

While Canada was

in a position to look at Geneva in 1954 with an air of rela
tive dispassion, the United States could not—

especially in

light of events since the fall of Kuomintang China in 1950.
The period of hostilities in Vietnam from 1946 to 1950
was looked upon by the United States mainly as an indigenous
struggle between the French and the guerillas in Northern
Vietnam under Ho Chi Mlnh.

This conflict was viewed largely

as a colonial one in which the United States did not want to
become militarily committed.

Such direct commitment, it was

felt, would cast the United States in the role of an advocate of imperialism, thus partially forestalling the evolution
of the underdeveloped world.

Moreover, the United States did

not want to become involved in the relations "between a mother.15
country and a colony.
At this time, the United States felt
nothing of the moral, military, or political commitment which
permeated American involvement from 1963 to 1967.

The turn

ing point in the earlier attitude came after Mao's control of
China.

This eventsâtaûneechhahgid the American appraisal of

15
D.D. Eisenhower, cited in V. Bator, Vietnam; A Diplo
matic Tragedy. (New York; 1965) p.6.
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the Indochinese conflict from one of an indigenous struggle
into the light of another communist confrontation.

At this

point the United States interest in French activity was also
reappraised.
The forces of the French Union, according to United Sta
tes policy, were
engaged against the forces of communist aggression
in Indochina (as) an integral part of the world
wide resistance by the free nations to communist
attempts at conquests and subversion (even though)
France has the major role there.
16
Thus "if Indochina fell," wrote Eisenhower,

"not only Thailan<

but Burma and Malaya would be threatened, with added risks
for East Pakistan, South Asia and (other parts) of Indochina
17
as well,"
Still, the United States did not want to shift
18
the war from French shoulders to theirs
and it was hoped
that the United States would not have to send ground troops
19
there.
Even by that time, however, there were events fo
menting in Indochina, and elsewhere, to make American direct
involvement there a fact.
16
Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1952, p.10101
17
Bator, op.c it .. p.l4.
18
Ibid. p.l4.
19
This was the opinion of then Vice-President Nixon.
New York Times, April 1 8 , 1954.
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By January 1950 Ho Obi Minh and. Peking exchanged repre
sentatives, and Moscow, shortly thereafter, followed suit.
Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the Viet-minh troops, also had
said in 1953 that, instead of harassing guerilla activities
pursued until then, "he was preparing an offensive attack
20
for the conquest of Indochina in its entirety."
The fall
of Dlen Bien Phu and the Geneva Agreements themselves, coup
led with these events, rounded out the conditions for direct
United States commitment.
The fall of Bien Bien Phu was a humiliating defeat for
the French.

While she was still militarily stronger than the

guerillas, Dien Bien Phu had a tremendous psychological effect
on the French people as well as the French army.

The already

war-weary public grew even more so after 15,000 of their best
forces were annihilated by the Viet-minh.

"There is no ques-

tion of the extent and nature of the French fighting this
war," said Bedell Smith, "they have been at it now for almost
21
eight years."
After Dien Bien Phu, the French obviously decided eight years had been long enough.
The French defeat had also come on the eve of the Geneva
Conference, and had the effect of generally softening their
position regarding an Indochina settlement.

Not only were

20
Bator, op.c i t ., p.10-11.
21

Department of State Bulletin,

(March 7, 1954), p.589.
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they eager for a negotiated settlement, but they desired to
rid themselves of a war they knew they could not win.

It

was largely this desire that fostered the final agreements,
over eighty per-cent of which were devoted to military with
drawal,

Because France wanted to get out of Vietnam quickly,

the result was a rather abortive conference which left the
cause of the Indochinese war untouched, i.e. political settle
ment of Northern and Southern Vietnam.

These developments

set the atmosphere for the Geneva Conference, and made it in
creasingly difficult for a genuinely stable solution.

More

over, when an agreement was drawn-up, the United States would
not sign.
American domestic opinion in 1954 remained virulently

22
anti-communist, especially anti-Chinese communist.

The

United States still had not recognized Mao’s regime, and
Dulles was, therefore, reluctant to affix his signature to a
document which bore Chou En-lai’s also.

Moreover, the United

States, as Canada, was there only as an interested party, and
did not feel ready at this time to commit itself ^
Indochina,

.jure to

The United States would, however, respect the

accords, and "view with grave concern" the action of anyone who
violated them.

They had even included this in the appendage

to the accords— an appendage which was partly responsible for
American involvement later.

22
See below Chapter 5, and M.A. Guhin, "The United States
and thetChinese People’s Republic; The Non-Recognition Policy
Reviewed", International Affairs, Vol.45, No.1, January, 1969,
p.44-64.
This aftïcië contains instructive Congressional and
public opinion in the United States during the middle fifties.
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By "Viewing with grave concern" any violation of the
agreements, the United States had become ^
party committed to seeing them work.

facto the only

They had, in fact, under

written the agreements to the point that additional commit
ments, if necessary, would be forthcoming.

This attitude, :

however, was couched in global terms as a determination to
preserve international security.

Bedell Smith put the Ameri

can case succlntly when he quoted the main provision of the
addendum.

Here it was affirmed that the United States would

refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb
the agreements, but....would view any renewal of the
aggression in violation of t h e ....agreements as se
riously threatening international peace and security. 23
This commitment was reinforced In 1955 by Eisenhower's
controversial letter to Diem, new President of South Vietnam.
In it Eisenhower put forth the prospect of "American aid given
directly (to Vietnam) to assist in (her) present hour of
24
trial."
By giving aid directly to South Vietnam, the United
States had become the main provider for the infant republic,
and was to that extent committed to make it work.

Since 1949,

the United States had been giving military and economic assis
tance to South Vietnam, but had always done so through France.
With this letter, overt ties to France were removed and the

23
M. Raskin and B. Pall, "How the French Got Out of Viet
nam", in The Vietnam Reader, (New York;1967).p.86.
24
Ibid. p. 100.
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United States was alone responsible for South Vietnam and the
Diem regime.
It is interesting to note that contained in both docu
ments the express reasons for aid were resistance to aggresaSion,

This, Eisenhower and Smith had both stated.

Such re

ferences point up the fear of communist subversion in Vietnam
shared by policy-makers in the United States.

Whether guerilla

activity at that time could be construed as such was a tech
nical point and not considered.

However, what was important

was that, rightly or wrongly, communist subversion was thought
to be possible in Indochina, and that the United States had
to act to try to contain it.

By these references the United

States had placed the Indochinese question in the context of
the Cold War struggle.

It, therefore, was to be the justifi

cation for their presence in South Vietnam.

Moreover, such a

rationale would not make American presence there imperialist
ic.

This justification was to make a reversal of American

policy more difficult in later years, as was the massive aid
program to the Diem regime of the late fifties.
The huge assistance program carried on by the United Sta25
tes to Vietnam
reinforced her verbal commitment, even though
it did nothing to solve the intricate social and political
problems which were at the root of the trouble.

For these

25
It was estimated that fully 65 percent of the Vietnam
ese economy was supported directly by the United States in the
period from 1954-1955 to approximately 1957. See W. Henderson,
South Vietnam Finds Itself", Foreign Affairs 1957. Vol.35,
No.2, p.271-283, p.280.
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particular problems, it was felt that Diem himself could con
solidate diverse elements in Vietnam, and many held him up
26
as a sort of saviour to that country.
This aid and the ho
pe in Diem, combined with the Manila Pact, or SEATO, in 1954,
to complete the conditions for an Increased American commit
ment.
The Manila Pact was designed, "to the extent that it
(was) practicable, throw a mantle of protection over Laos,
27
Cambodia and the free territory of Vietnam,"
Such a man
tle, said Dulles,
(would), in fact, make a substantial contribution
to preserve free governments in Southeast Asia
and prevent communism from rushing into the Paci
fic area where it would threaten the defense of
the United States.
28
SEATO went into effect late in 1954 and was, no doubt, part
of the reasoning behind United States aid.

Thus, by 1955,

the United States had undertaken the moral and political com
mitments which would inextricably involve her in the Vietnam
crisis culminating in the sixties.
Behind these commitments lay one theme, containment.
However, by associating Vietnam with containment in general,
the United States was trying to solve essentially political
26
Eisenhower and Cardinal Spellman among them,
27
Barter, 0 0 .cit .. p,l62.
28.
Ibid, p. 162,
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problems by military and economic means.

Indeed, even mas

sive aid did not alleviate the root cause of the dilemma.
What that aid did in fact was to make the Diem regime and
Vietnam, more dependent on American tutelage than ever be,2
fore.

In effect, the United States had built a castle on sand.

By i9 6 0 the castle was falling.
American activity in Vietnam in the early fifties was
largely not an issue per se in Canadian-Amerlcan relations.
Such American involvement, however, was to play a large part
in these relations later in the decade.

It is significant,

though, that precisely during the years of increasing Ameri
can involvement, 1950 to 1955, Canada was careful to remain
somewhat aloof, prior of course to her 1080 appointment.

In

deed, before Geneva, Pearson felt that because "the problem
of Indochina had never been submitted to the United Nations,
29
Canada had never been as directly concerned with Indochina,"
Moreover, it was logical that, after having been involved in
Korea, Canada wanted little to do with another theater of war.
This unequal emphasis is significant because while the lOSO
was her first close association with the area, the United
States had been concerned to the point of giving aid for at
least five years.

Thus, at the time of Canada's election to

the IC8C, the United States felt it had vital interests in
Vietnam and, because of the troika principle, Canada would

29
D.C, Masters, Canadian World Affairs, 1953 to 1955.
(Toronto:1959) P.81. --- -------------------------
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be the one to look after them.

Moreover, In 1954 Canada did

not share any of the neurotic factors of aversion to commu30
nisia that permeated American policy in the Par East.
All
these factors were to make Canada's position on the lOSC more
difficult to pursue, and a possible source of friction in
Canadian-American relations.
Because Canada accepted a position on the ICSC she was
"in a sense committed to trying to make the Geneva settle31
ment effective."
Yet it was an agreement to which the Uni 
ted States had not given their unconditional support.

Indeed,

even the government of South Vietnam had refused to sign the
accords.

Moreover, Canada was "taking on an important duty

in a part of the world with which she had no direct acquain32
tance."
Now, however, "there was no United Nations direc33
tion of policy or responsibility"
as there had been in Kor|j
There was,-;also, none of the international justification tha
came with the United Nations.

On the contrary, from the be-|

ginning it was tacitly assumed by all concerned that Canada |
was there for one purpose, to look after United States in30
Holmes, op.cit.. p.458.
31
Ibid. p.461.
32
Ibid. p.471.
33
Ibid. p.471 .
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terests.

Although Canada would like to believe

she is there because of her reputation for
fairness, impartiality and objectivity, (she
was put there) because she is a close ally
of the United States and a....member of the
NATO alliance.
34
Thus, the expectation of satellitism was apparent even in

.

1954

Under any conditions, a completely Impartial Canadian
judgement on the commission would have proven difficult, but
it became even more difficult in light of the Intense Ameri
can build-up after 1963.

In this regard membership on the

commission proved less than helpful to Canadian prestige and
interests, since any stand supporting American policy could
make Canada appear as a "lackey of the imperialists" or a
"Western Poland."

Similarly, staunch refusal to condone or

offer a rationale for American policy could have led to a de
terioration of Canadian-Amerlcan relations at a time, the
middle and late fifties, when there was much anti-American
sentiment anyway.

Assumption of a place on the commission,

therefore, offered Canada little but a chance to moderate
American policy, somewhat along the lines of the Korean Crisis.
lihen the Indochinese war flared up again in the early six35
ties, her role on the commission was not conducive to such
34\
llngh, op.cit.. p. 129.
31
There was never really a complete halt to the Indochi
nese War, even from 1954 to 1958. Events in North and South
Vietnam were smoldering such that there was always some ho
stility, most of which was subversive in nature, though not
always supported from the North.
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Influence, and It was at that time that Canada expressed her
views in other ways.
It is important to note that the period 1954 to 1958
was one of relative calm in Vietnam.

This was, no doubt due

in large measure to the fact that Ho Chi Minh felt confident
that, should elections take place, he would win them.
view was generally shared by all, even Eisenhower.

This

When, in

1956, it became evident to Ho that elections were not going
to take place, it was only then that the conflict was re-initlated, on a gradually ascending level.

The point is, how

ever, that it would be unfair to suggest that Canadian ac
tivity on the commission, or the commission itself, fostered
the conditions that led to the intense hostilities of the
sixties.
this.

Indeed, there were few at this time who foresaw

Moreover, the commission had succeeded in overseeing

a cessation of hostilities between the French and the guer
illas,,and in troop withdrawal;
1954 accords.

the main provisions of the

There were, thus, no loud calls for negotia

tion that permeated the period 1963 to 1967, and thus no real
reason for Canada to try to initiate them.
While there were general problems in accomplishing the
ultimate objective of peace in the area, Canada acknowledged
them.

Indeed, the ICSC had issued reports which pointed to

that fact.

"The degree of cooperation," said the 1957 re

port,
given by the two parties is not the same.

While
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the commission has experienced difficulties in
the North of Vietnam, the major part of its dif
ficulty has arisen in the South."
36
This memorandum, with Canada in agreement, is indicative of
the responsible position she took during this period.

It wgs

this type of posture that enabled Paul Martin to say that
Despite the temptation to live up to the con
ference's expectations, Canada decided from the
beginning to avoid the role of rigid advocate for
the West and instead tried to promote an objecttive and balanced approach by the commission.
37
This Canadian response to developments In Vietnam during
that period were very much similar to her response to the
Korean question earlier in the decade.

Canada, in the late

fourties, took a judicious approach to UNTOOK, and one that
she felt was necessary.

On the ICSC there was more at stake

than being a voice for the United States, for it became ap
parent that Canada's prestige was on the line as well.

A

responsible approach to ICSC work conceivably would garner
more diplomatic credits in Asian eyes than being a mimic for
the United States,

This reasoning could not have been absent

from Canadian thinking.
Canada's attitude of reserved agreement regarding cross
ing the thirty-eighth parallel for the first time in 1950,
can be likened to her at least tacit support of increased

36
ICSC Report to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Convention.
1957.
37
Singh, op.cit.. p. 129.
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American involvement in Vietnam.

At no time did Canada

roundly come out and express misgivings about American po
licy in the earlier stages of commitment.

Importantly, when

there was apprehension, as in the 1957 report, this was giv
en mainly in the context of the ICSC itself, that is, in
terms other than a bi-lateral exchange between the United
States and Canada.

Moreover, there was no need for inten

se concern In the early stages of the Vietnamese conflict,
since there was no real imminent danger of widespread war.
At that time there was, thus, no justification for indiscrimlnantly "ruffling the eagles feathers."

It was not until

the early sixties, when the position of the Diem regime had
deteriorated such that stepped-up American military commit
ment was necessary, that the situation grew more dangerous.
At this time. Increased guerilla activity in the South of
Vietnam was evident, and it is not unreasonable to assume
that it was sponsored by the North.

In these circumstances

Canada reacted differently, and, still in agreement with the
goals of American policy, took an overt stand supporting
them.
In the ICSC minority report of June 1962 Canada disavow
ed any condemnation of increased American military activity
in Vietnam- activity which was construed by India and Poland
as being a clear violation of the Geneva Agreements which pro
hibited "the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops....
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38
military personnel....arms and munitions,"

Canada's minor

ity report offered what amounted to a rationale of American
policy in Vietnam,

I

The majority report, in essence, stated that military
action had been taken against installations In the North of
Vietnam by the South, and indicated the seriousness of the
39
situation,
Canada, while agreeing that "the situation con
tinued to be unstable," believed that the cause "must be seen
40
in context,"
lest one
run the risk of giving the members of the Geneva
Conference a distorted picture of the problem in
Vietnam and its underlying causes.
41
What followed was a carefully worded justification for the
attacks on the North by the South,

Such raids, said the

minority report,
(were) a dramatic manifestation of a continuing
instability which has (been)....the deliberate
and persistant pursuit of aggressive but largely
covert policies by North Vietnam directed against
South Vietnam. 42
38
See David Schoenburn, Vietnam; How We Got In. How To
Get Out. (New York; 1968) p. 130.
39
ICSC Report, op.cit.. June 1962.
40
Ib i d .
41
Ib i d .
42
Ibid.
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The North, moreover,
(has) allowed their zone to be used for inciting,
encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in
the zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of
the administration in the South, 43
The report further stated that, because of Increased arms and
support for anti-Saigon guerillas,
the government of South Vietnam has been obliged
to request increased foreign aid for self-defense,

44

By placing the onus of guilt on the North, Canada was
sane t i d i n g Southera r e t a l l a ^ ^ .

More over 7'''%'ooor'^nR to "tE

minority report, the events which had transpired were "the
direct result of the aggressive policy of the government of
North Vietnam" and that such activity 'bonstituted the root
45
cause of general instability in Vietnam."
Thus, not only
had Canada laid the blame at Hanoi’s feet, but later stated
that it would be up to her to cease such action "as a prere46
quisite of the restoration of peace in Vietnam,"
The re
port, by implication, also held out the United States as some
what of a saviour of South Vietnam.

43
Ibid.
44
Ib id .
45
Ibid.
46

mi.
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Canada’s action in view of these hostilities pointed up
her increasing concern over Vietnam.

However, it is well to

remember that even then there was no imminent danger of wide
spread war.

Canada, therefore could reasonably go along with

the policy of the United States somewhat in deference to the
letter's deepening commitments.

There was, moreover, good

reason to believe that the Canadian position was an accurate
statement of what she felt was really happening in Vietnam.
The action of India and Poland can be construed as Inter
preting the violation in the letter of the agreements rather
than in the spirit.
understandable.

In the case of Poland their position is

However, Indian action could also be inter

preted as an expression of her reluctance to sanction American
activity in Vietnam;

activity which India may have construed
47
as American surpression of an Indigenous national movement.
Thus, it is reasonable to Interpret the Indian and Polish

majority report in light of other developments,

Ifhlle much

the same can be said for Canada, there is less reason to
assume a strict subservient role with respect to the United
States, especially when the Diefenbaker government was still
in power.

It would seem folly Indeed to jeopardize a

hitherto judicious role on the commission, for what was
then thought to be ilmple retaliation, and which no one

47
It is also well to remember that the 1962 report appeared
prior to the Sino-Indian border clash.
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felt would escalate as quickly as it did.

Similar to the

Korean Crisis, therefore, Canada was taking a pro-American
stance not only because she believed it justifiable but becange there was really no point in doing otherwise.
However, with the air raids on the North by American
bombers in 1965, Canada’s concern became intense, and her
r eaction to Ame r l o a ^ oollcv from that time to 1967 was one of
D

attempted modification,_____
The period from 1964 to 1967 was marked by a period of
intense escalation on the part of both North and South Viet48
nam and the United States,
The air raids on the North,
moreover, made for an extremely dangerous situation and one
that Canada sought to retard.

This period was also marked by

many attempts by Canada to bring the parties to the Vietnam
conflict to the negotiating table.
The American rationale for increased activity in Vietnam
was that "a gradual commitment, with gradual punishment would
4$
(at some point) discourage the communists."
If we had gone slam bang right at the first (in
1963 he added) we might have won or started World
War III. 5 0
48
See A, Whiting, "How We Almost Went to War With China",
Look Magazine. April 29, 1969, p.76-79.

49
J.R. Dickenson, "How will History Remember LBJ?", Nat
ional Observer. January 20, 1969, by an aide of then President
Johnson.

50
Ibid.
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Thus, the idea of gradual escalation would serve to inform
the North of the tenacity of American purpose, yet do it in
such a manner so as not to alarm her powerful neighbor. Com
munist China.

Gonceiveably, Canada could be counted upon to

go this far also, so long as there was no danger of World
War III.
With the escalation, however, Canada felt that "the si51
tuation (was) more serious than it had been for some time."
So serious in fact that it could (have led) to a great cri52
sis.
We are all deeply concerned with the impli
cations for world peace (said Paul Martin)....
(increased military activity) contains the
seeds....of an open conflict of stark and
terrifying proportions....(and) only if all
concerned are prepared to exercise restraint..,,
can the next step toward peaceful settlement
be taken.
53
In this period the mission of Chester Ronning in 1966 is
also significant in that it pointed up the Canadian desire to
reach a negotiated settlement.

By that time the bombings had

been in effect for over a year and the threat to world securi
ty had been increasing proportionately.

His efforts were

accompanied by other Canadian initiatives led by Lester Pear
son.

51
External Affairs. Vol.16, No.9, Sept., 1964, p.412.
52

Ibid. p.412.
53
Ibid. Vol.17, Ho.4, April 1965, P.114-116.
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It is significant to note that in this period there was
an almost world-wide consensus to do something to facilitate
a cessation of hostilities.

Secretary General of the United

Nations, U Thant, the Belgian Prime Minister, and many others
were all calling for negotiations.

While there were critics

of American policy in the United States and in.Canada as well,
all seemed to agree on the need for negotiation.

The NDP

Party, even though they did not approve of American policy,
agreed with Paul Martin in "calling for a cease-fire and ne54
gotiations,"
Diefenbaker, now leader of the Opposition,
55
also felt the same way,
and in the United States, Senators
Morse and Pullbright were constant critics of the war.

In

essence, while Canada's reaction to the infiltration was not
worth an open break with the United States, their reaction to
the bombings were of a different nature.

While there was no

pressure to act in the earlier stages, Canada now deemed it
necessary to try to do something.

Pearson's speech in Phila

delphia in 1965 was indicative of that pressure.
"The progressive application of military sanction," said
Pearson, "can encourage stubborn resistance rather than a
56

willingness to negotiate".

"Continued intensification of hos-

54
Debates, 1965, p.13095.
55
Ibid, p. 13093-1407.
56
Ibid, 1 9 6 5 , p.35-36.
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tllitles", he added, "could lead to uncontrollable escalatlon.

Earlier Paul Martin had also expressed concern

that the war "could go well beyond the borders of (Vietnam]
itself" and that the United States "should avoid the oonsequ#]
58
1
ces of escalation,"
Thus, to alleviate this danger, the 1
Canadian government felt that a suspension of the bombings,|
at the right time,
might provide (Hanoi) with an opportunity if
they wish....to inject flexibility into their
policy without appearing to do so as the direct
result of military pressure.
59
Pearson thereupon suggested that
"a measured pause... .might facilitate the de
velopment of diplomatic resources which cannot
be easily applied to the problem under existing
circumstances." 60
With statements as these Canada foresook passive agreement
with American policy in favor of open diplomatic manoeuvres
to influence it, although she still clung to the basic tenet
that communist influence in Southeast Asia was not desireable.
Canada's reactions to the Vietnam War pointed up her de
sire to modify American policy when she felt that policy was

57
Ibid. 1965, p.35-36.
58
Ibid. 1965, p.1779.
59
Ibid. p.35-36.

60
Ibid. p.35-36.
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"nTi n n ilTi "'1'rrir 'T -nTn
^.c^lty.

i ffith immediate threats to ¥_qr'i

Just as in Korea, Canada attempted to forestall the

imminent danger of world war.

The only difference in the

United States reaction, however, was that unlike Korea, the
threat to world peace did not seem to loom as lar ge , and
therefore Canada's influence and initiatives were not as
effective as they might otherwise have been.
Thus, analogous to the Korean situation, change of Amer
ican policy would have to come from within, Canada's contri
butions not withstanding.

This is the typical American re

action when the United States becomes deeply committed to
anything, Vietnam included.

This is not to say that the

Canadian peace-feelers were negligible..

Indeed, Ronning's

mission in 1966 made clear Hanoi's refusal to negotiate un
less there was "an unconditional and permanent end to the
6l
bombing,"
The point is that Canadian initiatives, unless
they are in concert with American predispositions, will not
be very effective.

While Canadian reactions can be predict

ed on the basis of the direct ratio between hostilities and
world security, American policies cannot.
rrlTlnj

Throughout the

nanaAa'a response combined self in

terest and judiciousness with a desire not to unduly aggravate

American relations.

This main theme and simi-i

lar reactions will be seen again in the question of Communist
Chinese diplomatic recognition.
61
See Raskin and Fall, op.cit., p.470.
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V
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION
OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
The question of recognizing the Communist Regime in
Peking has been an important one in Canadian-American rela
tions since the 1949 fall of Ghiang Kai-shek's Nationalist

1
Government.

While there have been occasions

policy in this matter has

when Canadian

been criticized from within, the

principal effect of non-recognition in Canada has been the
ever-present symbol of deference to American policy.

Here,

as in perhaps no other Canadian policy consideration, the
overbearing influence of the United States has been one, if
not the only, factor which has retarded Canadian action.
The initiative which in 1969 the Trudeau government has taken
on the question of recognition was indeed a bold step when
seen in light of developments since 1949.

This action is

neither illogical or spiteful, but, rather, it is in keeping
with the basic Canadian reaction to American policy.

That

reaction entails a deference to Washington policy until such
policy proves to be a possible danger to world security, as
in Korea and Vietnam, or until Canadian interests are no
ticeably furthered by divergence from American views.

1
See Debates. on this question from October 1949 to June
of 1950, especially the NDP party's reaction,

88
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On the question of Chinese recognition, Canada, under
both the Liberals and Conservatives, felt that neither of
these two conditions were so prominent as to precipitate an
open break with Washington.

On the contrary, during this

time Canada has shown a great deal of forebearance to the
American cause.

Whether this attitude was out of understand

ing, fear, national interest, or a combination of these, it
was a wise course to take in that the "China question" proved
to be a highly controversial and embarrassing one for the
United States.
0 “^

The origins of the United States-China policy go back to
the eighteenth century.

"The American concern about the

'Open Door' in 1899 was the latest expression of a long-con*
tanue# interest (in China) which had been manifested in com-

2
mercial, missionary and diplomatic channels,"

While it is

not within the scope of this paper to give an historical ac
count of United States activity there, it is worthwhile to
note a few of the overriding American policy interests with
respect to China.

As will be seen, these attitudes were not

shared by Canada, thus making her look at the collapse of
Chiang Kai-shek In a very different light than did the United
States,
Basically, there were, and still are, two Interconnected
foundations for American concern about China, and the Par East

2
Pairbank, op.cit.. p.251.
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/ generally.

One was the desire for "an amenable China re

ceptive to American officials, missionaries, students and
3
businessman."
Below the superficial, yet by no means in
significant, desire for trade with the Orient lay the spirit
of Manifest Destiny in United States-China relations.

This

spirit was exhibited not only in the intense missionary work
of the time, but also in the emotional attachment for the
Chinese as a people, which was shared by many who had first
hand contact with them.

The other concern, more recent, has

been a search for a "balance of power capable of guaranteeing
4
American security in the Pacific."
These two objectives
were complementary in that a compliant China in the fields of
trade and commercial enterprise, would be one in the field of
diplomacy as well.

All this would, it was believed, lead to

the optimal American objective in the Par East-"an indepen
dent China, strong enough to preserve its security, but one
5
prevented from gaining control over its major neighbors."
This goal, however, grew more illusory with the Chinese Civil
War which was being pursued intermittently from 1927 to 1949.
3
N.A. Graebner, "China and Asian Security; An American
Dilemma," International Journal. Vol.XVI, No.3, (Summer :
1961) p.213-230, p.213.
See also H.R. Isaacs, op.cit.. Ch.5.
4
Ibid, p.213.
5
P. Greene, United States Policy and The Security of
A s i a . (New York;19 6 8 ) p.37.
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In the early stages of that conflict the American fear
was not so much of Ohlang’s collapse, as it was of the col
lapse of a China integral to United States Par Eastern pol
In the middle forties, when the defeat of Japan was

icy.

imminent, China seemed the only logical country to fill the
power vacuum thus created.

In the eyes of American policy

makers it was reasonable to contend, therefore, that China’s
capabilities, although not at the moment obviously effective,

6
were latently enormous.

China, thus, should be groomed to

inherit the Asian leadership which would be rendered vacant
by Japan’s demise.

This was the rationale for the American

sponsored drive which ultimately sought great power status
for China.

Thus, when China assumed her seat on the Security

Council of the UN as one of the Big Five in 1945, she did so
less by her own merit than by United States influence.
China's status under Chiang, however, was ^Mücy to
the least.

Like the Saigon regime, it too collapsed, and with

it American hopes for an amenable China and one conducive to
United States policy.

The shock in which the American people

greeted that collapse was significant and will be dealt with
later.

Suffice it to say now, however, that prior to the

massive American aid to Chiang and his regime, the United
States had evolved to policy based more on self-interest.

6
S. K. Hornbeck, "Which Chinese?", Foreign Affairs.
Vol.34, No.3, October 1955, p.24-39, p.2%1
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Canada, as mentioned above, shared little of the kind of
7
interest in China that the United States had.
Although there
had been great potential in Sino-Canadian trade, such poten
tial was never, until recently, realized.

The fact is that

while the United States was making a half-turn to the East
from 1 8 9 8 to 1 9 4 5 , Canada was consolidating her position with
in the Empire and, later, the Commonwealth.

After World War

II her main concern had been in finding a place for herself
in a restructured International state system.

Thus, "Canada

had been neither personally nor emotionally engaged in the
(American) post-war effort to bolster the Kuomintang, and
there was none of the feeling of having ’lost China’ which

8
deeply affected American thinking."

When Chiang was subsequ

ently driven from the mainland in 194-9, some felt that Cana9
dian recognition would come as a matter of course.
However,

7
Che exception of course was the work of Norman Bethune,
Canadian doctor and surgeon who worked in China during the
Civil War. Mao Tse-Tung called him "a great internationalist",
and one from whom "all (can) learn the spirit of absolute un
selfishness."
See Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao TseTun&,(Peklng;l952) Vol.II.
Even with Bethune’s example, however, missionary zeal in
Canada held none of the popular appeal it had in the United
States. Missionary activity in general, then, was not frought
with as many political overtones and therefore not as signifi
cant in Canada as the United States,

8
J, Holmes, "Canada and China; The Dilemmas of a Middle
Power," in A,M, Ealpern ed,. Policies Towards China; Views from
Six Continents, (New York;1965) p,103-122, p,104,
9
0 , Ronning, "Nanking:1950", International Journal, V o l .X ::
XXII, No,3, (Summer;1 9 6 7 ) p,44l-45t, esp, p.442-443,
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recognition did not come then, largely because of the out
break of the Korean War soon afterj, and has not come at this
writing, mainly due to the truculent attitude of the United
States,

■/

An examination of relations between the United Stat

es and the Nationalist Government from 1945 to the Korean War
offers some insight into the American aversion to the Peking
Regime.

In view of the Canadian desire not to indiscriminate

ly run counter to American policy, this examination also part
ly explains Canada's reasons for non-recognition at that time.
Former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hillsman, speak
ing in 1964 of Chiang's collapse said that the American reac10
tion was "anger and disbelief, a sense of betrayal,"
The
McCarthy era was an indication of how deep and widespread that
feeling was.

Indeed, at first glance it would seem well found

ed in that in the period 1937 to 1949, the United States had
poured over two billion dollars worth of aid, military and
11
economic, into the shaky Nationalist Regime.
Such aid was necessary, in Truman's words, for the deve
lopment of "a strong and progressive China making a full con12
tribution to the strength of the family of nations,"
The

10
Department of State Bulletin,
17, P,16,

January 6, 1954, p.11-

11

See The China White Paper.
esp, p,1043“ io44.

August 1949, p,1042-1046,

12

ibi d. p.981,
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China that Truman had In mind, however, long since had proved
inept, as the long internal struggle had seriously weakened
the Nationalist Government, not only militarily and econo* ■
13
mieally, but also politically and in morale.
The same gov
ernment that had received massive injections of United States
help had, through graft and nepotism, "lost the crusading
spirit that won the people’s loyalty during the early stages
14
of the war,"
Is a result,
they had sunk into corruption and a scramble
for place and power,,,,into a reliance upon
the United States to win the war for them and
preserve their own domestic supremacy,
15
Chiang's ineptness apparently had been suspected by Tru
man as early as 1946 when, in a letter to Ohiang, he felt that
the United States could not "be expected to continue in its
generous attitude toward (him) unless (there were proof) that
16
genuine progress was being made"
toward a peaceful settles
mefitof China's internal problems.

To this end, Truman sent

General George Marshall to China for the purpose of a nego
tiated settlement of the Civil War.
It would seem, then, that Truman was, at this time, more

13
Ib id . p.VIII,
14
Ibid. p.VIII;

See also H.E, Isaacs, op.cit,. Oh, 8-9,

15
White Paper, op.cit,. p.VIII.
16
Ibi d . p.652,
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Interested in a stable China than he was with a stable Nati
onalist Government,-

It was also obvious in Marshall's mis

sion that the search for a peaceful China seemed to override
concern for Ohiang Kai-shek, at least in 1946,

"It was im

perative" said Marshall, "that efforts be made to bring (Mao)
into the government and that the greatest care should be taken
17
to avoid having military action disrupt the negotiations,"
"The Communists", he added, "were too large a military and
18
civil force to be ignored,"
It is plausible to assume, then, that during the period
1945-1947 the official response to the Chinese civil war had
none of the emotional fervor that was to dominate it in later
years.

The reaction then was more pragmatic and less tainted

with fear of Communism,

Indeed, Truman himself, in 1945, said

that,
peace, unity, and democratic reform in China
will be furthered if the basis of (China's)
government is broadened to include other po
litical elements in the country,
19
Dean Acheson also, in 1948, seemed to be playing down the U n
ited States involvement.
The United States (he said) must not become
directly involved in the Chinese Civil War

17
Ibid, p .127-145,

18
Ib id , p, 127-145,
19
Ibid. p.272.
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(or) assume responsibility for underwriting
the Chinese government militarily and econo
mically.
20
"Present developments," he went on to say,
make it unlikely that any amounts of United
States military or economic aid would make
the present Chinese government capable of
re-establishing and then maintaining its
control throughout all of China.
21
Thus, the American official attitude prior to the collapse of
Ohiang seemed to be evolving to one of resignation.

Indeed,

the publication of the Department of State "China Ifhite Paper",
showing the corruptness of the Kuomintang and massive American
aid, was an attempt to relieve the United States of responsi
bility for his debacle.
It was also apparent that, seeing the imminence of his
fall, the United States had to look out for its own interests.
Indeed, as Acheson had said, American policy "should preserve

22
maximum freedom of action,"
ency,

in case of just such a conting

It is logical to assume, therefore, that American pol

icy-makers, if not the American people, were at least aware of
Chiang's tenuous position and were preparing for his demise.
It is also logical to assume that, in view of Mao's triumphs,
the United States was gradually trying to remove the stigma of
20
Ibi d . p.280,
21
Ibid, p.281,

22
Ibid. p,286.
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supporting the Nationalists and quietly disengage themselves
from Chinese internal politics.

It was apparent that, in

this period, the United States was,, in some vague way, stri
ving toward a modus vivendi with Mao and the Communist Re
gime.

In light of this, the furore that surrounded the "loss"

of China seemed unwarranted.

While this is to a certain ex

tent true, it does not take into account pertinent Internal
developments of American politics.
While Chiang's fall from power had been prepared for in
the State Department, there was no such preparation for the
general public.

It was the latter that was dismayed at the

so-called "loss" of China and men like Senators Knowland,
McCarthy, Bridges and Jenner parlayed this loss into politidal.fortinsi.

Thus, charges that the State Department had

been infested by Communists, although groundless, were never
theless exploited by politicians in 194-9 and 1950,
Whether or not these charges, and the resultant public
opinion stemming from them, would have prevented the United
States from ultimately recognizing the new regime is largely
speculative, but it is conceivable that they would not.

In

deed, even the New York Times in January of 1950 had said
'
l

that "recognition was inevitable" and "just a matter of time",
A Gallup Boll as late as June 1950 indicated that fully 6o

23
MoA, Guhin, op.cit., p,47.
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percent of the public had no opinion or were in favor in re24
cognition.
The whole upshot of the situation in the mid
dle of 1950, then, was a gradual evolution of United States
policy towards recognition.

Even Acheson, writing in 1950,

seemed to be preparing the nation for it.
It is abundantly clear (he said) that we must
face the situation as it exists in fact. We
will not help the Chinese or ourselves by bas
ing our policy on wishful thinking,
25
Indeed, the great moralist, John Poster Dulles, in a rare mo
ment of candor, had written in 1949 that, if the Communist
government of China proves its ability to govern China with
out serious domestic resistance then it (should not only be
26

recognized but also) admitted to the UN."

Clearly then, as

late as June 7, 1950, the decision not to recognize the Peking
Regime would stem from quarters other than the United States
government.

The actions of the Peking Regime itself at this

early stage proved to be the stumbling block.
It is significant to note that even during the early sta
ges of the Nationalists fall, and after 1950, both the Cana
dian and American delegations did not leave the mainland or
24
Ibid. p. 4 7 .

25
R, Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs,
ed, by A, Doak Barnett, (lew Y ork ;Ï966) p,i07.
26

Q, Wright, "Non-Recognition of China and International
Tensions", Current History. Vol.34, No,199,(March;1958) p,152157.
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the capital of Nanking,

This is indicative of the prevalent

attitude among those observers then in China, as they too were
apparently preparing for recognition.

Indeed, American Am

bassador Leighton Stewart had for a long time
seen the handwriting on the wall forecasting the
inevitable downfall of (the Nationalist) regime,..,27
Thus, the official American source of information was obvious
ly cognizant of Chiang’s collapse, and was preparing to stay
in the Chinese capital to try to accomodate Mao Tse-tung,
The assumption that the United States was, in late 1949,
preparing for recognition is strengthened by the American de
cision to authorize Stewart to stay in Nanking when Ohiang
28
fled to Canton,
Indeed, Stewart had even rejected the
Nationalist invitation to leave Nanking for the new national29
1st capital.
The Canadian delegation also seemed to be preparing for
recognition.

Indeed, by 1950

there was no doubt (on the part of Canada's le 
gation) that the criterion for recognition of the
new government had been adequately met,
30
These criteria, as put forth by Lester Pearson, consisted of

27
Ronning, op.cit,, p,42,

28
Ibid. p.442.
29
Ibid. p.442,
30
I bi d, p,442.
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"independence of external control

, an ability to control

the territory it claims," and that it be reasonably well-de31
fined,
"When these requirements are met," continued Pear
son, "consideration should be given to the recognition of a
32
government in China or in any other part of the world,"
Chester Ronning, head of the Canadian Delegation in Nanking,
thus "assumed that the embassies and legations in Nanking
33
would be moved to (Peking)," and therefore that recognition
would be shortly forthcoming.
If both the American and Canadian governments were pre
paring for recognition, however, the initial actions of the
new regime at least retarded those developments.

Because of

the Chinese harassment of Mr, Stewart, his eventual arrest,
and other belligerent acts against American personnel, im
mediate United States recognition was not forthcoming.

This

is not to say it was the only reason for non-recognition, but
that this type of Chinese activity made the United States
government increasingly less amenable to recognizing the new
regime.

So too, Mao himself did not seem to be entirely well-

disposed to American support of iliang.

He had felt that such

31
Debates, 1949, p .1108,
32

Ibid, p,1108,
33
Ronning, op.cit,, p.442,
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support was an attempt to "reduce China virtually to a Uni34
ted States colony."
Liu Shao-chi also said, in 1948, that
it would he extremely harmful and erroneous
to harbor illusions that American imperialism
would in good faith help the Chinese people to
achieve real independence, peace and democracy.

35

Canada, however, was not in the same position and their
delegation did not suffer similar harassment.

Thus, it was

likely that while both Canada and the United States were preparing to accomodate the Peking Regime, theCanadian Government probably would have done so first.

Indeed, Great Bri

tain and India had already done so, and it would seem, owing
to the memory of Bethune and the amiable relationship between
Chou En-lai and Chester Ronning, that Mao would have been in
favor of its acknowledgement.

To this end, thus, Ronning and
36
Chou were making arrangements for reciprocal recognition.
Reciprocity was extremely important in the Canadian view.
Indeed, according to Ronning,
Ottawa wanted to avoid the embarrassment of ex
tending unreciprocated recognition as that experlenced by the United Kingdom.
37
Even though Canadian public opinion in 1950 was not thought to
34
R, Blum, op.cit,, p,94,
35
Ibid. p,94.
36
Ronning, op.cit,. p.444,
37
Ib id . p,444i
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be fully in favor of recognition, it was felt, by Pearson
and St. Laurent, that in due course recognition would be
38
accorded.
The whole situation was altered, however, by the
outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950.
For both Canada and the United States the Korean War sig
nalled a re-appraisal of the recognition question.

When Com

munist Chinese "volunteers" entered the war, recognition, it
seemed, was shelved indefinitely.

While Canada and the United

States looked at the war differently, they both arrived at the
same conclusion —

recognition of the Peking Regime could not

come at that time.
In the view of American policy-makers, the invasion of
South Korea was effected with at least the approval and quite
possibly the aid of the Soviet Union.

China, moreover, was

probably not unaware of such aid and perhaps even encouraged
39
it.
When the thinly veiled "volunteers" entered the war this
possibility became a reality,
that

It was apparent at that time

the traditional American desire for a well-disposed

China

and one which could act as a favorable weight in the

balance of power in the Far East was no longer possible.

This,

coupled with the hostile public reaction and the height of the
McCarthy furore,made it impossible for the United States to
38
Paul Martin, address to University of Windsor, March 15,
1969.
39
Truman, op.cit,, p,342 et, seq.
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recognize the People's Republic of China.

Truman's order to

the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Formosa Straits, moreover,
while originally intended to limit the war to the Korean pen
insula, had the effect of protecting Chiang from a possible
invasion from the mainland.

From that point, then, tacit

American support for the Formosa government was implied, and
this was to become the symbol of American refusal to recog
nize the Mao Regime,

Canada's refusal, although due in no

small measure to American attitudes of 1950, ostensibly came
as a result of her membership in the UN,
40
Because Canada was committed to the still Infant US’,

she felt it essential to preserve the principle of collective
security.

Since it was becoming increasingly apparent that

the failure of this principle would place the UN in a grave
alongside the old League of Nations, Canada felt it impera-tive to uphold collective security.

Moreover, because the UN

had named China the aggressor in the Korean War, Canada felt
it would be impossible to then recognize her.

Thus, according

to Lester Pearson,
Until the war ends and China abandons her
attack against the United Nations in Korea,
there can be no question o f ,,,«recognition
of that regime in Peking.
There can be no
question even of considering it while the
Chinese defy the United Nations in Korea
and fight against our (sic) forces there,
4l
40

See above Chapter III,
41
Debates 1951, p,2750.
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Previously, because of Internal opposition and a gener
al desire to proceed cautiously, Canada had withheld the for
mal act of recognition.

Conceivably, she was also content

with the progress of the Ronning-Chou negotiations.

How

ever, when the Korean War broke out, Pearson thought that
Canada "did not feel justified in taking any action toward
recognition until the circumstances surrounding aggression in
42
Korea became clearer."
Similarly, "when Peking joined in
the aggression in Korea it was inconceivable that (Canada)

43
would change (her) policies.

The United States took a sim

ilar view of recognition, since the American public became "adamently opposed to recognizing a government whose policies
during the Korean War brought humiliation to their land and
44
death to their young men,"
Thus, the outbreak of the Korean
War served to justifiably postpone recognition for both Ca
nada and the United States, at least until after the hostil
ities had ended.
By the time the Korean War was over, however, the United
45
States looked at China and saw nothing but Communism,
With

42

Ibid. 1950, P.B55..
43
Ibid. 1950, p.555
44
J, Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs 1955-1957. (Toronto;
1967) P.76,
45

Fairbahk, op.cit., p.4,
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the Dulles and Eisenhower era, "new moral criteria became
46
the deciding factors" to recognition,
thus making it more
difficult to accord.

For Canada, that era also proved to be

a tripwire for recognition, since it became apparent that
"an ill-timed act of recognition by Canada might appear (to
47
the United States) as a betrayal and a slap in the face.
■In John Holmes* words,
the United States became so deeply committed
against Peking that recognition by any of its
allies was bound to appear more unfriendly than
such a move had seemed when the British, Dutch
and others had acted before June 1950. 48
Thus, the Canadian government acted accordingly and withheld
recognition.

This was done, however, not so much out of a

fear of Washington reprisal, but rather in the hope of retain
ing the status of America’s good friend and ally.
Indeed, prior to this time Pearson was quick to point
out that
recognition does not imply or signify moral
approval,but it is simply acknowledgement of
a state of affairs that exists.
49
Similarly, the Canadian government
46
Ronning, op.cit., p.442-443.
47
Eayrs, op.cit.. p.26.
48
Holmes, op.cit.. p.104,
49
Debates, 1949, p.1838.
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rejected completely the Marxlst-Lennlst prin
ciples espoused by the Chinese Communists.
50
It is obvious, therefore, that during the Korean War, and until 1954, the Canadian government exhibited justifiable de
ference to American policy.

From 1954 onward, however, Cana

dian action regarding recognition can be viewed as a "persis51
tant yet frustrated attempt"
to recognize the Peking Regime.
The United States, however, during these years found it increasingly difficult to recognize the Chinese Peoples Repub
lic.
If the United States was anywhere near recognition in 1950,
the Korean War quickly erased any possibility.

From 1954, then,

American policy became more adamantly opposed to Mao's Regime
and at the same time more disposed to the Formosa Regime of
Chiang Kai-shek.

From withholding recognition on the moral

grounds that Communism was evil, after 1954 the United States
began withholding it on strategic considerations and holding
it up as humanitarian alternatives to Communism.

These attl-

tudes also involved the United States more deeply in its commit
ment to Taiwan.
At the end of the Korean War the Nationalist Government
acquired a special place in the American security policies of
the Western Pacific.

Dean Acheson had outlined the Pacific

50
I b i d . 1 9 4 9 , p. 1 8 3 8 .
51
Holmes, op.cit.. p.104.
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defense perimeter prior to the conflict, but had omitted

52
Korea and Formosa.

However with the presence of the Ame

rican Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits during the Korean
War, and later on with SEATO, Formosa had come under the
mantle ofRAmerican security.

In 1954 the Seventh Fleet was

still in the area although for reasons other than limiting the
aggression to the Korean peninsula.

Then, what seemed the

overt protection of Formosa served a different purpose.

This

purpose evolved during the middle fifties as a "concrete and
necessary symbol of the American determination to contain the
53
Chinese Communists.
In addition to such containment American policy makers
expressed the hope that the communists would encounter insur54
mountable obstacles in their attempt to consolidate control.
This was possible it was felt in "light of the many decades
55
of chaos in China as a whole."
Thus, if the People's Re*-publie proved incapable of successfully consolidating their
hold on mainland China, the Nationalist Government, in exile
on Formosa, would be offered as an alternative.

By support

ing the Nationalist Government, the United States hoped to
undermine the faith in the Peking Regime.

To further this

52
See above Chapter III.
53
Blum, op.cit., p.240.
54
Guhin, op.cit.. p.54.
55
Ibid. p.54.
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erosion, moreover, the United States withheld diplomatic re
cognition.
In the middle fifties, therefore, the Mao regime was
56
spoken of as "a passing and not a perpetual phase".
In4deéâ,hy 1958, fully nine years after Mao had conquered the
mainland, Dulles was still harping on the same theme,

"While

it is true," he said
(that) there is no reason to believe that the
Chinese Communist regime Is on the verge of
collapse....there is equally no reason to accept
its present rule in mainland China as permanent.
He went on to say that one day the regime will pass.
withholding diplomatic recognition

57
"By

from Peiping, therefore,

the United States sought to hasten that passing.

.58

The island of Formosa was consequently held up as the
only legitimate successor once that passing was effected.
The successful preservation of Taiwan, therefore, as a rival
and alternative to Peking became a basic element in American
policy.

It was for these reasons that the American commit

ment to Taiwan, as well as American aid to the island increas
ed in the fifties.

This aid and hope was underwritten by an

assumption of the military defense of Taiwan which had been
a result of the off-shore island crisis of 1954-1955.

56

Graebner, op.cit.. p.221
57
Blum, op.cit., p .121.
58

Ibid, p . 121.
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that crisis, the United States and Ohiang had agreed to the
Mutual Defense Treaty which "assured the Chinese Nationalists
that the United States stood squarely behind them as far as
59
defense of Formosa was concerned,"
Thus, during this time
the:lmerican government was moving farther and farther away
from recognition because of Increased military and strategic
obligations.

At the same time, however, Canada seemed to be

preparing more than ever for the recognition that was close
in 1950.
Understandably, American activity and UN commitments from
the years 194-9 to 1953 retarded the not always latent desire
on Canada's part to recognize Communist China.

During this

time, however, she could offer a justification for non-recog
nition on grounds other than a deference to Washington.

In

deed, it was quite plausible for Canada not to recognize a
power which had been labelled an aggressor by an organization
which was becoming more and more important to her foreign po
licy.

Similarly, years of war-time cooperation with the Unit

ed States and the necessity for the letter's partnership in
NATO must have been uppermost in the minds of Canadian policy
makers .

After the Korean War was over, however, Canada took

a different position on recognition and began to look at the
situation more pragmatically.
Speaking in the Commons in 1954, Pearson stated that

59
R.P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs,1954.
(New York:1955) P.280-2ÏÏU
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Canada had to be "realistic" on the problems of recognition
and "be prepared to deal with those who represent the nation

60
over which they exercise authority,"

He was offering not

only a different emphasis to the problem of recognition, but
was preparing the nation for the realities of the Geneva Con
ference.

Indeed, "the necessity of dealing with Red China
5i
at Geneva," said Pearson "is inescapable."
He was also hope
ful that perhaps the Chinese attitude itself would change,

and make it easier for Canada to gain more leeway on the re
cognition question.

This could only be done, however, if

Peking made efforts to remove the stigma of aggressor with
which the United Nations had labelled her.
"If China adopts a conciliatory attitude at the Geneva
Conference, "Pearson said, "Canada might take a new look at

62
this problem."

This hope for a more conciliatory posture

on Peking's part would be for Canada at least the crack in
the door which might signal formal recognition.

Still, the

United States attitude was weighty, since any decision of such
import "required a careful balancing of national and inter63
national factors."
Indeed, Pearson even quoted Dulles on

60
Debates 1954, p.2748.

61
Ibi d. 1954, p.3545.

62
Doc, c i t .. p.3545.
63
Ibid. p. 3 5 4 4 .
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the realities of the Chinese question who said that "diplo
matic intercourse

(is useful) between those who exercise ^
64
facto governmental authority,"
Thus, the Canadian government during the middle fifties
seemed to be coming much closer to the real issues that re
cognition implied.

It is significant that Canada began in

creasingly to speak of the tangible advantages and disadvanta
ges:

of the question than echo the moral criticisms of Ameri

can policy makers.

Canada was, in Pearson's words, "taking

another look at the problem - a more realistic, less emotional look.

Indeed, Canada had even divorced herself from

the dangerous possibilities of conflict pregnant in the
Offshore Island Crisis of 1954-1955.

Speaking of that crisis

Pearson commented that while Canada
could not stand aloof from a major war which
threatened the very existence of the United
States (she)....did not consider that crisis
to be such a situation;
or one requiring any
Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese
Nationalist regime.
66
It was apparent that Canada, while she never forgot the close
ties that bound her with the United States, was not about to
become engaged in another war so soon after Korea.

In this

vein of self interest, any Canadian decision to recognize the
64
Ibid. p.3544.
65
Ibid. 1956, p.711-712.

66
Ronning, op.cit., p.49.
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Mao Regime would be based on "the national and international
67
advantage"
for Canada.
It is significant to note that during this period, while
Canada was taking important steps to make recognition of China
a fact, there were two overriding concerns.

One was the fact

that by 1957, after Mao had withstood eight years of American
non-recognition and the first offshore island crisis, a Can
adian refusal to recognize Peking could easily be construed
as undue deference to Washington.

While this in itself was

not advantageous, the fact that the United States might, by
some stroke of fate, recognize Red China before Canada did
was even less so.

This is made even more significant since,

during the middle fifties, internal criticism regarding heavy
American investment was prevalent.

Cries of Canada's being

the ploy of American investors were extremely difficult to
take and, moreover, such eùtbursts were usually given credence
by the example of Canadian unwillingness to recognize Peking.
Because United States intransigence on the recognition issue
had acquired a symbolic significance, the issue in Canada had,
come, by 1957, to reflect the domination of Canadian external

68
policy by American interests.

On the issue of Chinese recog-

67
Debates 1953, p.2748.

68
Eayrs, op.cit.. p.79.
See also J, Holmes, op.cit.,
p . 104-116.
The influence of Diefenbaker was, in no small way,
also responsible for this attitude.
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nition, therefore. It would be useful for the Canadian govern
ment to take the initiative on the question "but fatal to be
69
beaten by the Americans themselves,"
This element was
another of the very real and pressing problems faced by Cana
da on the recognition question during the middle fifties.
Another important concern facing Canada was the Chinese be
havior itself.
The Korean Conflict, Chinese action in Tibet in 1951»
and her expressed desire to consolidate her hold on Taiwan
had always retarded Canadian recognition.

It was events such

as these which prompted Pearson to cautiously appraise the
recognition question, yet always doing so in a manner to re
frain from taking an unalterable position on the matter.

When,

therefore, prior to the first Offshore Island Crisis, the
Peking Regime had proven reasonable in the Geneva n e g o t i a 
tions, Pearson expressed the belief that recognition, then,
was not out of the question.

Indeed, after Geneva he had said

that while Canada should not read too much into the improve70
ment, "(she) would also be unwise to ignore it."
In a
sober look at Peking's hostility Pearson did not want to appear
too much like his American opposite number, John Poster Dulles.
According to Pearson, Canada should not get into the position
where she would be "demanding positive proof of utter purity
69
Eayrs, op.cit.. p.79.

See also Holmes, op.cit

70
Ibid,

p.8 0 .
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71

from (the Peking) Regime,"
diplomatic recognition.

before consideration of formal

The first offshore island shelling,

however, could not be overlooked and, because Oanadian-American intrahemispheric relations from 1954 to 1957 had deter
iorated so badly, recognition again was out of the question.
The whole upshot of the situation in the middle and late
fifties was the result of Canadian ambivalence made more difflcult by increased American rigidity.

Even though Peking

was more conciliatory in the years 1954 to 1957 Canada could
not recognize Communist China as long as the American oppos
ition was so intense.

Indeed, Pearson, speaking in 1956 had

put the Canadian case succinctly. Recognition, he said "was
72
not worth having a first class row with the United States."
As non-recognition continued into the sixties other con
nected issues came to the fore;

the admission of Red China

into the UN and the question of Taiwan's status.
Because Chiang and his Nationalist Government continued
to hold the Chinese seat at the UN, the issue of Taiwanese
as opposed to Nationalist representation became clouded by
the larger question of Communist Chinese admission.

Strictly

speaking the Taiwanese per se were not represented at the
United Nations.

For both Canada and the United States, the

71
Ibid. p.80.
72
Reford, op.cit.. p.20.
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political question of recognition and admission had to take
into account the interests of the Taiwanese people.
For United States policy in the early and middle sixties,

the question of Communist Chinese recognition and admission
to the UN became more a matter of prestige than strategy.

Indeed, speaking in 1964 Roger Hillsman had said that the
United States "had no reason to believe that there is a pre

sent likelihood that the Communist Regime (would) be over73
thrown."
This was merely the formal expression of what had
been fact since the Korean War.

United States non-recogni

tion policy by the sixties was based on the fear of Communist
subversion of her non-Communist neighbors.

Where earlier,

recognition had been withheld in an effort to weaken the re
gime itself, by i9 6 0 there was really no basis for this hope.
Since the danger in the sixties lay in subversion, the United
States felt it still had to contain Red China as well as iso
late her.

Then, however, isolation would be strategic and

defensive Instead of an attempt to undermine her internal po
sition.

Moreover, such isolation would remove the threat of

militancy espoused by the Chinese Communists.
The adherence to violence ran through most of Peking's
policies in the late fifties and early sixties and was of
fered as one reason for not allowing her admission into the
UN.

Because this theme had been incorporated Into the Ame

rican rationale for non-recognition and admission since the

73
Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1964, p. 11-17,
p . 13.
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Korean War, there arose the fear that any variance In the
American position would be construed as tacit agreement of
Peking's policies, and therefore could not be tolerated.
Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, speaking in 1964, sum
marized the American case when he said such a conciliatory
attitude "would be very unwise and (would) Indicate to Peking
74
that a policy of militancy is profitable and pays dividends.
Thus, a favorable attitude to Red Chinese admission could not
be considered, as the letter's espousal of violence would
conflict with Article 37 of the UN Charter.

Moreover, admi

ssion of Peking and recognition would, in effect, break the
American commitments made not only to the people of Taiwan,
but also to the other non-communist nations of Asia which had
relied upon American support.

A reversal, therefore, on the

United States non-recognition policy would render her suspect
in the eyes of many non-communist Asians.

United States pres

tige, then, would inevitably be impaired from such a turna
bout .
Prestige was also the issue in the UN itself since, by
i9 6 0 , the United States had become the champion of those who
were wary of Peking's admission.

By I960, however, and even

as early as 1958, international conditions had so changed
that the once assured American domination in the UN had become
weaker.
74
Bulletin, 1964, p.8l8.
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Because of the influx of the many Ifro-Asian nations
in the late fifties, the once-sure voting block commanded by
the United States lay open to erosion on certain issues.
Since for many of these new states independence from the West
was the, keystone of their founding, they radically altered
the global structure from one of bi-polarity to poly-centric.
In effect,these nations had a mind of their own in foreign
policy, with the result that the United States could no lon
ger count on majority support that It once had In the UN.
For the United States in these yearss the Issue of prestige
was indeed an important one,
Dulles, however, writing in 1949, had put the recognition question succinctly.

"If the United Nations membership

were made substantially universal," he wrote,
that might end a preponderant voting superiority
of the United States and its friends which, while
pleasant is somewhat fictions....
....if we want to have a truly world organization
then it should be representative of the world as
it i s . ...75
True as Dulles' words were, and are, the United States govern
ment still could not reconcile Chinese admission with support
for the Taiwanese government, since control of Taiwan was, for
Peking, a sine qua non for diplomacy with the West.

A tole

rable attitude toward admission, therefore, would turn over
de facto the island of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists - the
same island which had become the pillar of the American non-

75
Guhin, op.cit.. p.44-48.
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recognition policy.
Concern for Taiwan was also becoming apparent in Canada's
view of recognition and admission.

For Canada, the status

of Taiwan had never been settled satisfactorily.

While she

was somewhat cool to the Nationalist regime itself, she show
ed concern for the people of Taiwan.

Even though Canada was

aware of the need to deal with Communist China, the answer to
the recognition question did not lie in accomodating Peking's
desire to control Taiwan.

It was for this reason, then, that

in 1961 Canada introduced the "Two-China" or "one-China",
"one-Taiwan" policy.
The "Two-China" plan, as put forth by Senator Alfred
Brooks of the Canadian UN delegation, held out the possibility
that both China and Formosa could be admitted to the UN in a
manner which would not leave the Taiwanese people at the mercy
of Peking.

The future of (Taiwan) said Brooks,

is the affair of the people of (Taiwan).
Canadians
would never understand or accept a solution by which
(the UN) sanctioned the forcible extinction of the
political identity of (Taiwan). 76
This formula, however, was not in the least acceptable to
Peking.
Chou En-lai, as quoted by Pearson in the Commons, stated
that the Chinese People's Republic would "not tolerate any
76
P. Lyon, Canada in/World Affairs 1961-1963. (Toronto:
1968) p.3 0 3 .
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77
plot to carve up Chinese territory and create two Chinas."
The Canadian initiative, however, had lent a new twist to her
admission policy.

The concern now would be with the inter

ests of the Taiwanese people as well as with world diplomacy.
This Canadian approach was substantially different in
emphasis from that of the United States, which in that period,
had been stressing the dangers of Communist subversion.

With

this action, under the Conservatives, Canada gradually would
try to make recognition and admission possible under what she
considered equitable conditions for all concerned.

At the

same time, the Canadian non-recognition policy would come
under less criticism for an undue deference to United States
policy.
Canada’s action in 1961 reflected what was a pragmatic
shift in her policy toward Red China.

Speaking in the Commons

in 1959, then External Affairs Minister Smith had said that
Canada’s course should be "one of prudence based on an appre78
elation of the realities of the situation."
In that vein.

77
Debates I960, p.738.
Chou's statement apparently grew
out of concern for the "two China" solution which had been
spoken of in many quarters for some time.
The Canadian sta
tement of 1 9 6 1 , however, was received with so much publicity
and excitement that previous references were relatively un
important as far as this paper is concérned.
See Lyon, op.
cit.. p. 303- 305 .
78
Debates, 1959, p.l4o6.
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he felt that Canada should take the initiative in limited
79
fields, in fields of trade...."
By her one-China, oneTaiwan policy, Canada, in effect, was divorcing the issue of
Chiang’s Taiwan government from that of the recognition of

80
China.

Thus, as trade with Peking increased in the sixties,

Canada’s one-China, one-Taiwan policy evolved not only as an
equitable but also as an advantageous approach to the Chinese
question.

With this approach Canada, by 1969, had laid the

groundwork for the initiatives of the Trudeau government.
With the ^

facto recognition in a substantial increase

in trade between China and Canada, Canadian non-recognition
became less sensible.

Similarly, with Canada's one-China,

one-Taiwan policy, she could not be charged with neglecting
the interests of Taiwan itself.

Recognition as a course for

Canada, therefore, became more logical.

Continued non-recog

nition moreover, in the face of expanded trade, would appear
more like a deference to Washington than ever before.
It is significant to note, however, that during the mid
dle sixties, the Senate Foreign Relation Committee Hearings
on China, led by US Senator J.W. Fullbright began to take a
new look at the China problem.

The atmosphere in the United

States, while not altogether in favor of recognition was none
theless becoming less strident in opposing it.

This is not

to say that Canadian trade was directly Influenced by this

79
Ibid. p.l406.
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American attitude, but only that such attitudes made it less
disadvantageous for Canada to seek new answers to the nonrecognition question.
Basically, Canada's action in 1968-1969 reflected an at
tempt to recognize Red China which had been a latent desire
since 1949.

Indeed, she had succeeded, in the twenty years

from 1949 in reaching a modus vivendi with the Peking govern
ment and, considering the American position In the same period,
had been quite successful.

There was indeed de facto diplo

matic relations with Peking at Geneva and earlier in the
Korean negotiations.

What had happened under the 1968-1969

Trudeau government was in fact a realization that non-recog
nition as a policy for Canada had the effect of compromising
Canadian prestige in foreign affairs.

Her action in 1969,

therefore, must be seen as an attempt not so much to thwart
American policy as to advance the Canadian interest.

In this

respect the advantages of recognition outweighed the disad
vantages of possible American reactions in Oanadlan-American
relations.

Similarly, if continued non-recognition at this

stage had been pursued, it would have been valid to critici
ze Canada for unduly defering to Washington.

W h i l e , non-re

cognition could have been justified in the earlier years
because of Chinese intransigence and American over-sensitivity,
those conditions no longer seemed to exist in the same degree
that they had.

It would appear, therefore, that there was

a very real desire on Canada's part not to be beaten by the
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Americans on the recognition question, and thus once again
putting herself in the position of following the American
lead.
To further her own prestige, therefore, Canada has taken
a significant step toward recognizing the Peking regime.

This

80
step is made easier, moreover, by dint of the rather relaxed
position the American government had in 1966 through 1968,
Because it is not a crucial issue at the present time Canada
can further what she considers her own goals of independence In
foreign policy instead of adopting a reflexive position, wait
ing for Washington to act.

80
See Appendix II,
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CONCLUSION
While it is generally in the Canadian interest not to
diametrically oppose United States policies, this discussion
of Canadian-imerican interplay in Asia suggests that there
will be times when this desire is superceeded by the way in
1

which Canada interprets the ramifications of those policies.
In all of the areas under study, Canada has been in virtual
agreement with most of the main 1 iness of AmeTican^p6ÏicliêsT
Significantly, however, this agreement has always been pred
icated on the conditions that United StatëF'pôïiciês' would
n ot endanger world peace or visibly impede Canada's pursuit
of self-interest.

When these conditions were either unattain

able or in jeopardy, Canada questioned American tactics alt h o u g E s h â s t ï ï ï a g r e e d with the principles underlying those
policies.
1

These remarks will be drawn from the proceeding discus
sion of interplay in Asia, and are not necessarily intended
to be universally applicable to Canadian and American polic
ies.
Indeed, different circumstances dictate different poli
cy approaches, and what may have been true in Asian interplay
may not be true in other areas.
This analysis simply attempts
to glean major Canadian reactions, and their justifications, to
American policy in the Asian arena when circumstances demanded
a choice between following or not following the American lead.
However, a detailed study of Oanadlan-American policy in other
areas might bear out many of the conclusions drawn here.
123
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Canadian actions in Vietnam and Korea can be separated
somewhat from her policies on the question of Communist Chi
nese recognition.

In the first two instances, especially

Korea, the dangers of world war were indeed present.

In the

last, it was not so much a direct threat to world security
that was at stake as a furtherance of singularly Canadian in
terests.

Throughout all three areas, however, Canada has shown

that her similarity to American

policy is based

perceptions as well as on deference to

on her own

Washington.

It is significant to note that, in each of the areas un
der discussion, Canada sought to reconcile her position with
that of Washington in the early stages of mutual involvement,
even though she did not ultimately align with American pol
icy.

This can be seen not only

in her constant

attempts to

modify the implications of that

policy but also

inher efforts

to bring about negotiations.

In the Korean Crisis, Canada was

among the first to seek United Nations help in utilizing the
de facto cease-fire along the thirty-eighth parallel for nego
tiation.

In Vietnam, although the Canadian Influence may not

be known for some time, it is nonetheless probable that Chester

2
Honning's mission

did innno mean way contribute to the Paris

Peace Talks of 1968-1969.

The Canadian accessability to both

belligerents, moreover, cannot be discounted.
Canadian attempts toward negotiation show her concern not

2
Raskin and fall, op.c it .. p.470.
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only for world peace but also for the future of the OanadlanAmerican "partnership."
__

Realizing that Canadian prosperity

^

.

depends significantly on American prosperity and cooperation,
she ^ e s

not want to needlessly endanger the rapport within

which relations are conducted.

By choosing not to indiscri-

minately run counter to American policy, even though internal^urlLluy may M V o cate thi¥7"~Canah£r*oifers whatinant be cun<strued as genuine concern for that nol^cv.

It cannot he

denied that the similar policies of Canada and the United
States are conditioned in part by similar backgrounds and he
ritages.

For Canada however, the success of Canadian-American

relations also depends a great deal on her general agreement
with American policy.

Thus, while Canada did disavow certain

aspects of American policy, tnis came only wnen such policy
was thought to be on a collision course with world war.

At

that time, Canada subjugated the concern for Canadian-America:
rapport to the concern for Canadian security,

(7)»^
f '

Importantly, this Canadian position has revealed the ex
tent to which she has gone in sacrificing the marginal bene
fits which might have accrued from a more favorable stance
vis-a-vis Washington.

While such benefits are always a matter

of degree, Canadian policies have indicated that she would
not go to the brink of war to achieve them.

Although she

might have satisfied her internal critics by her pursuit of
a more declaratory and sometimes anti-American foreign policy,
the point is that Canadian interests and interpretations were
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pursued, and that this meant a disavowal of certain American
policies.
The method which Canada chose in this pursuit is also
relevant,

Canadian behaviour in the areas discussed exhibit

a dependence on quiet diplomacy in most of the early stages
of conflict.

However, open diplomacy was used when Canadian

positions became Intractable.

This utilization of open di-

pTbmady ln""tiMFs' of crisis served a two-fold purpose.
By publicly refusing to endorse all the implications of
American policy, Canada placated adherents of an "independent

foreign policy.

p

More importantly, however, Canada em

phasized what appeared to be an open break with ¥a"shingioïI.
This signaled an end to the typical American attituae oi tax - ^
ing Canada for granted.
In addition to the unique ease in Canadian-American re
lations since 1945, there has developed in Washington an
attitude that on any given question, Canada would fully en
dorse United States policy.

While this has been shown to be

false, the attitude is significant for it is an example of
the faith which Washington has in Ottawa decision-makers.
Thus, when Canada does not completely conform to American po3
licy there arises not so much criticism as dismay and shock.
The effect of Canadian disavowal lies more in the intangible
need for psychological approval than it does in hard and fast

3
Canadian tactics and opinions on trade with Communist
countries is an important exception.
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practical support.

In a word, the question is asked, "If

we cannot count on Canada, then who is left?"
Canadian prestige since 1945 has been garnered more by
her diplomacy and inoffensiveness than by the exercise of her
limited power.

Her support, therefore, brings with it this

aura of goodwill and acceptability.

This is what is sought

after by Washington rather than an overt display of force.
The United States is rarely wanting in the resources to carry
out a given policy, but lack of acceptability and justifica
tion among her allies may often times tone down the implies tiens for such policy.
This is not to say that American policy in the areas dis
cussed was ultimately determined by the Canadian reaction.
Indeed, the domestic environment in the United States was
often the crucial factor in American decisions.

It must be

remembered, however, that in the early stages of each area
of study, Canadian endorsement, either overt or tacit, was
present.

While American policy would most probably have evol

ved in much the same manner without Canadian approval, it is
K

not too much to suggest that

'

" "

I

Canadian hacking gave the

psychological sanction w h ich at least gave impetus to that

Since 1945, the reconciliation of Canadian independence
with Canadian-American interdependence has been at the heart
of interplay in Asia.

For Canada, this reconciliation has

always had a greater significance than for the United States,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128
since it was, in fact, a search for a modus vivendi between
f— —
■"
the national interest in its many forms and United states
predominance.

Ultimately, however, Canada relied upon her

own interpretation of self-interest, American preponderance
not withstanding.
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APPENDIX I*
Ï3ADE OF CANADA (EXCLUDING GOLD), BY CONTINENTS, 1938-42
Values (Millions of Dollars)
Item And Continent
1938

1939

1940

1941

1942

EuropeUnited Kingdom
Other Europe

119.3
39.9

114.0
37.1

16 1 .2

219.4
6.9

161 .1
5.2

North AmericaUnited States
Other North America

424.8
17.4

496.9
17.1

744.2 1,004.5 1,304.7
36.6
24.6
3 2 .9

21.8
32.6

2 1 .1
38.1

1 6 .2

1 8 .6

5.5

8.2

IMPORTS

South America
Asia
Oceania
Africa

19.2

36.2
63.2
25.8
7.6

5 6 .8
7 4 .8

36.9
12.9

44.1
46.2
36.2
13.8

677.5

751.1 1,082.0 1,448*8 1,644.2

EuropeUnited Kingdom
Other Europe

339.7
78.1

328.1
57.9

508.1
28.7

6 5 8 .2

11 .6

741.7
53.3

North AmericaUnited States
Other North America

270.5
27.0

380.4
28.7

443.0
41.4

599.7
77.6

885.5
95.9

14.0
36.3
51.2
20.8

1 6 .2

44.8
46.1
22.7

21.0
35.7
45.2
55.9

2 9 .8
6 9 .6
49.1
1 2 5 .4

' 19.8
202.1
110.6

TOTALS IMPORTS
EXPORTS(DOMESTIO)

South America
Asia
Oceania
Africa
TOTALS, EXPORTS

837.6

924.9 1,179.0 1 ,621.0 2 ,3 6 3 . 8

*
Source ;

2 5 4 .9

Canada Year Book 1967.
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Appendix I continued.....
Percentages of Total
1938

1939

1940

1941

1942

17.6
5.9

15.2
4.9

14.9
1 .8

15.2
0.5

9.8
0.3

62.7
2.6

66.1
2.3

68.8
2.3

69.3
2.5

79.4
2.0

3.2
4.8
2.4
0.8

2.8
5.1
2.5
1 .1

3.3
5.8
2.4
0.7

3.9
5.2
2.5
0.9

2.7
2.8
2.2
0.8

iOO.O

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

40.6
9.3

35.5
6.3

43.1
2.4

4 0 .6
0.7

31.4
2.3

32.3
3.2

' 4lil
3.1

37.6
3.5

36.9
4.8

37.5
4.0

1.7
4.3
6.1
2.5

1.8
4.8
5.0
2.4

1.8
3.0
3.8
4.8

1.9
4.3
3.0
7.8

0.8
8.5
4.7
10.8

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0
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APPENDIX l a*
TRADE OP CANADA BY LEADING COUNTRIES, 1966 , MITE COMPARABLE
RANK IN1964 1965 1 9 6 6 ITEM AND COUNTRY
DOMESTIC EXPORTS
1
2
3
4

1
2
3
4

1
2
3
4

7
5

9
5

8
9
6
17
15
12
10
14
11

8
7
6
10
15
12
11
14
12

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

18

16

13
19
23

17
18
20
21
19
23
25
22
24
26
30
27
29
28

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

16

26
20
30
21
22
27
25
28

24
29

5
5

25

26
27
28
29
50

1
2
4
5

1
2
4
5

1
2
3
4

3
6
7
13
9
11
8
14

3
6
7
10
8
9
11
12

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

*Source:
------

1964
#'000

1 9 .6 5 _____
#"000

â'non

^

United States
I 4 ,2 7 1 , 0 5 9
Britain
\ 1 ,199,779
Japan
\ 3 3 0,23 4
Union of Soviet Re
publics
315,943
China, Communist
1 3 6,26 3
Germany, Federal Re
public
211,360
101,582
Netherlands
Belgium & Luxembourg
100,535
145,812
Australia
Italy
62 ,2 3 6
India
64,042
Norway
67,582
France
7 9 ,4 3 3
Venezuela
64,075
Republic of South
69,1 6 6
Africa
Cuba
6 0 ,9 3 0
Mexico
65,151
33,714
New Zealand
Argentina
26,889
Poland
6 2 ,6 5 3
Spain
21,235
Sweden
2 9 ,9 2 2
Peru
1 0 ,7 4 9
Jamaica
28,9 4 2
2 8 ,5 0 2
Switzerland
Pakistan
20,031
Colombia
2 1 ,2 5 2
Trinidad
17,791
Brazil
22,985
15v408
Puerto Rico
TOTALS, 3 0 LEADING
COUNTRIES
7.685,255
GRAND TOTALS, DO
MESTIC EXPORTS
8 ,0 9 4 , 2 1 9
IMPORTS
United States
5,164,285
Britain
573,995
174,388
Japan
Germany, Federal Re
public
1 7 0 ,3 9 2
Venezuela
2 70,62 1
Prance
68,687
67,462
Italy
3 8 ,7 9 4
Sweden
Belgium & Luxembourg
59,198
Netherlands
39,933
Australia
59,827
Switzerland
36,932

4,840,456 6 ,0 2 7 , 7 2 2
1 ,1 7 4 ,3 0 s 1 ,1 2 2 , 5 7 4
393,892
316,18 7
1
!

197,362
105,131
189,493
127,766
128,011

I

140,372
93,223
58,453
82,456
87,273
73,045

3 2 0 ,6 0 5

184,879
1 7 6 ,8 0 0

143,113
117,505
117,359
114,787
1 07,6 6 2

107,014
84,541
75,958

76,226

7 4 ,3 9 3

5 2 ,5 9 4
5 1,00 6

61,436
52,145
41,750

36,845
3 2 ,7 2 0
31,5 6 5
3 3 ,8 2 5

28,980
21,864
3 0 ,2 8 0
2 7 ,0 9 5

21,643
17,362
2 1 ,5 3 2

17,509
17.693

3 9 ,5 2 9

37,404
36,900
36,574
36,355
3 3 ,5 0 0

31,010
25,671
25,397
23,337
21,157
19.560

8,132,276 9,690_^52&
8.525,078 10.070.627
6,044,831 7 ,1 3 5 , 6 1 1
644,741
6 19,05 8
230,144
25 3 ,0 5 1
209,517
2 5 4 ,6 7 c
9 6 ,103

80,279
55,568

2 35,2 0 7
2 1 5 ,0 5 9
106,65 1
8 6 ,7 1 8

56,274
47,372

72,541
61,555
60,489
59,573

4 3 ,986

5 0 ,2 7 9

7 2 ,0 2 7

Canada Yearbook 1967.
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APPENDIX Ib*
CANADIAN TRADE WITH CHINA AND JAPAN, 1870-1936
CHINA
JAPAN
Exports to Imports from Exports to Imports from
1670............ #

36,782

1875

36,782

301 ,970

i8 6 0 ............

10,619

350,939

1885............

5,972

1 ,6 2 2 , 1 6 8

1 8 9 0 ............

34 ,9 2 6

1 8 9 5 ............

3 6 7 ,8 5 3

942,493

10,307

1 ,572,937

1900............

254,814

6 2 9 ,7 2 9

110,735

1 ,751 ,415

1 9 0 5 ............

9 8 0 ,8 7 6

541,837

5 0 8 ,6 0 9

1,928,886

1910............

1,249,189

799,708

659,118

1,673,542

29 4 ,2 5 1

1,042,383

9 6 3,63 1

2,783,465

1920.............. 6 ,6 6 5 , 8 0 5

1,205,229

1915.............

1925

............

7,838,187

#

432,919

861

2

,047

,5 2 1 , 8 7 4

#

26,891 8

542,972

21 ,7 8 0

876,283

2 6 ,8 2 5

1 ,2 5 8 , 7 6 3

7,732,514 13,637,287
2 2 ,0 1 1 , 0 8 8

7

,0 0 5 , 0 5 6

1 9 3 0 ............. 1 6 ,5 2 7 , 9 5 9

2,977,022

30,475,581 12,537,253

193 5 ............

4,461,485

2,345,570

16,935,859

4,424,654

,5 5 5 , 7 2 6

3,717,181

14,844,137

3,466,081

193 7 ............

4,899,488

4,175,235

21 ,629,690

4,796,508

1938 ............

3 ,3 5 4 , 2 2 8

3,341 ,243

26,639,885

5,782,416

1936

............

4

LARGEST SINGLE YEAR
1926 ............. 24,473,446

5,041 ,592

1920............

13,637,287

1 9 2 9 ............

*Source;

42,099,968

A^K.Lower, Canada and the Far East - 1940, p. 51.
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APPENDIX II*
8IN0 CANADIAN TRADE 1961-19&6
(MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
Canadian Exchange % Of Canadian
To China
World Exchange
1961

123

2.1

1962

137

1963

Communist Ohinese Exports
To Canada

Canadian
Imports

3

Negligible

2.3

5

It

97

1 .5

5

1964

126

1 .6

9

1965

97

1 .2

13

1966

11 2

#

#

ft
II
II
II

14

COMMUNIST CHINA'S GRAIN PURCHASES
(MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS)
Total Grain
Purchases

Wheat Imports
From Canada

Chinese Purchases
From Canada as
of Canadian Total
Wheat Exports

1961

6 .2

1.47

14.8

1962

5.3

1.95

24.2

1963

5.7

1 .4 7

13 .7

1964

6.8

1.00

7.3

1965

5.7

1.76

1 7 .7

1966

1.63

*

Source:

The Business Quarterly (Summer:19 6 7 ) Vol.32, No.2,
Yuan-Li-Wu", "Oommunlst China’s Challenge To Canada",

.42-47,
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APPENDIX III
COLOMBO PLANS ALLOCATIONS
(^THOUSANDS)
FISCAL TEAR ENDING MARCH 31

India

Pakistan

Ceylon

Malaysia

Thailand

South Vietnam

Cambodia and Laos

Other South East
Asian Countries

Grants
Loans
Total

1951 to
I960

1961 to
1965

1966

1 6 6 ,5 2 3 . 0

127,404.1
10,000.0
137,404.1

3 6 ,9 7 6 . 4
20,000.0
56,976.4

70,355.2
7,000.0
77,355.2

11,999.8
12,000.0
2 3 ,9 9 9 . 8

33,000.0
199,523.0

Grants
Loans
Total

114,802.7

Grants
Loans
Total

2 1 ,9 4 5 . 0
1 ,9 7 6 . 2
2 3 ,9 2 1 . 2

9,701.7
9,701.7

,4 9 4 . 9
1,000.0
4 ,4 9 4 . 9

Grants
Loans
Total

2 ,4 4 2 . 9

8,976.9

2,000.0

Grant s
Loans
Total

1 3 2 .0

114,802.7

—

—

mm

2,442.9

8

I
1
1

Grants
Loans
Total

2,000.0

5 9 2 .4

721 .2

-

132.0

592.4

753.4
753.4

1 ,8 1 0 . 5

1 ,2 5 0 . 2

-

mm

398.2

732.9

299.6

—

—

398.2

7 3 2 .9

29 9 .6

,6 0 2 . 7

8,03311

2 ,8 5 6 . 0

—

Grants
Loans
Total

6

mm

,9 7 6 . 9

mm

Grants
Loans
Total

3

—

1 ,8 1 0 . 5

—

—

,6 0 2 . 7

8,033.1

2 ,8 5 6 . 0

348,676.3

2 4 4 ,2 5 6 . 8

92,598.1

6

Unallocated Regional Grant s
Reserve
Loans
Total
Total Allocations
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APPENDIX III Continued,,.

____
1967.

Total

19 6 8 ....

9 8 ,4 5 5 . 1

5 2 .0 1 8 . 3

20,000.0
5 6 ,9 7 6 . 4

38,000.0
9 0 .0 1 8 . 3

15,400.0^
12,000.0
27,400.0

1 0 .5 0 0 . 0
1 8 ,0 0 0 . 0

431.376.9
121 ,000.0
6 0 2 .3 7 6 . 9

28.500.0

2 2 3 .0 5 7 . 7
4 9 ,0 0 0 . 0
2 7 2 .0 5 7 . 7

2.502.0
2,000.0
4.505.0

2 .5 0 0 . 0
2,000.0
4.500.0

40,146.6
6,976.2
4 7 ,1 2 2 . 8

1,700.00
1,000.0
2,700.0

1 .5 0 0 . 0

1 6 .6 1 9 . 8
2 ,5 0 0 . 0

1.500.0
3,000.0

19.119.8

500.0
1,132.0

1,300.0

2.877.6
1,000.0
3.877.6

2,000.0

2,604.6

8,418.7

2,000.0

2,604.6

8,418.7

200.0

5 0 3 .9

2 ,4 3 4 . 6

500.0

503.9

2 ,4 3 4 . 6

1 .5 9 4 . 6

1.988.9

500.0
2 .0 9 4 . 6

50 0 .0

21 ,373.0
1 ,000.0
22,373.0

6 3 2 .0

8 0 0 .0
5 0 0 .0

2.488.9
,9 1 9 . 1

4,919.1

4,919.1

4,919.1

,9 1 9 . 1

982,402.6

4

ï5$;78667

1 3 2 ,9 1 5 . 7

4
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APPENDIX IV*
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 1968
*

Source ;

Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1 9 6 8 .

UNITED STATES ASSETS AND INVESTMENTS ABROAD
(^MILLIONS US)
1940

1945

12,275 1 6 , 8 1 8

1950

1955

i9 6 0

1964

1965

1966

31,539

43,323

67,964

99,117

106,174

111,874

(Asia) 2,291

3,112

3,569

APPENDIX IVb
MAJOR U.S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
(&MILLION US) 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 7
Far East

(Total)

l6,490

Far East Specific
Korea

4,320

China

2,1 8 8

Vietnam

3,229

APPENDIX IVc
DEVELOPMENT LOANS (US GOVERNMENT)
((MILLION US) 1958-1967

East Asia

andVietnam

(Total)

last Asia

andVietnam Specific

585,366

Bhina

&54,397

Korea

291,189

Vietnam

37,3l6

136

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3,891

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Government Documents
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons,
Official Report of
Debates, various volumes, 1946-196?.
Books
American Council on Education.
Canada-United States Con
ference on Mutual Relations. Hasbington; 1955.
Angus, E.F.,
Canada and the Par Eas t, 1940-1953.
University of Toronto Press, 1953u

Toronto :

Baldwin, David A., and Prank Smallwood, eds.
CanadianAmerican Relations. Hanover; Dartmouth College Press,
Ballantine, Joseph
Formosa a Problem for United States
Policy. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1952.
Bator, Victor. Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy, the Origins of
the United States Involvement. New York: Dobbs Ferry,

TgET:

Blum, Robert, A. Doar Barnett, ed..
The United States and
China in World Affairs. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1966,
Borg, D., American Policy and the Chinese Revolution 19251928, New York:
Octagon Booksl Inc., 19 6 8 .
Brandon, D. American Foreign Policy: Beyond Utopianism and
Realism. New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 19^61

Brecher, Michael.
The New States of Asia, A Political Ana
lysis . London: Oxford University Press, Ï9E 6I
Burnham, James.
Containment or Liberation.
Day Co., 1952.
Buttinger, Joseph.
Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled.
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers^ T96TI

York: John
New York:

137

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138
Ohang, Esln-hal.
America and China: A New Approach to A s i a .
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
Clarkson, Stephen, ed. An Independent Foreign Policy for
Canada? Toronto: McCllend & Stewart LtdT% 1968.
Clyde, P.H.
The Far East: The History of the Impact of the
West on Eastern Asia. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1952.
Davids, Jules. America and the World of Our Time, United
States Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. New I ork :
Random House, 19^0.
Dennett, Tylor.
Day, 1922.

Americans in Eastern Asi a .

New York: John

Dickey, J.S.
The United States and Canada. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964.
Dulles, F.R.
China and America: The Story of Their Relations
Since 17831 New York: Kennikat Press, 1967.
Dutt, Vidya Prakash.
China and the World, an Analysis of
Communist China's Foreign Policy. New York: Frederick
A. Praeger ,~~PublTshers, 19'6'4.

E ayr s , Jaraes. Canada in World Affairs,
October 1955 to June
1957. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Fairbank, John K.
The United States and China.
Harvard University Press, 1962.

Cambridge:

Fall, Benard B. The Two Viet-nams,
A Political and Military
Analysis. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,
T9 6 7 I
Fifield, Russell H.
Southeast Asia in United States Policy.
New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, T 9 6 3 T
Franklin, William F. A Historical Summary of United StatesKorcan Relations. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 7962.
Cattleman, Marvin E. Vietnam, History, Documents, and Opin
ions on a Major World Crisis. Great Britain: Penguin
Books', T 9 6 5 .

Glazebrook, G.P. det. A History of Canadian^External Rela
tions , Vol. II. Ottawa; McClelland and Stewart Limited,
1966.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

139
Goodwin, Richard N,
Triumph or Tragedy; Reflections on
Vietnam. Hew York: Random Rouse, 1966.
Gordenker, Leon.
The United Nations and the Peaceful
Unification of Ko r e a . The Hague: Martinus Hijhoff,
1959.
Greene, Fred. U.S. Policy and the Security of A s i a .
York: McGraw Hill Hook Company, 1968.

Hew

Griswold, A. Whitney.
The Par Eastern Policy of the United
States. Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
Gruening, Ernest, and Herbert Wilton Beaser.
Vietnam F ol l y .
Washington, B.C.: The National Press, 196EI
Guttmann, A. Korea and the Theory of Limited W a r .
B.C. Heath and Company, 19 6 7 .

Boston:

Hahn, Walter P. and John 0. Ress. American Strategy for the
Huclear A g e . Garden City: Anchor Books, 1960V
Halpern, A.L. ed. Policies Toward China. Views from 3iz
Continents. Hew York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965.
Hammer, Ellen.
Vietnam: Yesterday and Today.
Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc.^ 1966.

Hew York:

Harrison, H.Z.C.
Canada in World Affairs, 1949 to 1950.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1957.
Hinton, Harold 0. Communist China in World Politics.
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966.

Boston:

Horowitz, I.L.
Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and
Practice of International Stratification. Hew York:
Oxford University Press, 1966.
Hudson, G.P.
The Hard and Bitter Peace, World Politics Since
1945. Hew York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers^ 19&7.
Iriye, A k i r a , e d . U.S. Policy Toward China, Testimony Taken
from the Senate Foreign Relations' Committee Bearings'
7 T 1 9 6 'ë"I sFstonT Little Brown and Company, 19 6 8 .
Isaacs, U.S.
Scratches on our Minds; American Images of
China and India. Hew York: Capricorn Books, 1962.
(Ch. 5-9 incl. Esp. PP. 124-164).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

Kahn, George M., and John W. Lewis.
The United States In
Vietnam; An Analysis In Depth of the History of America's
Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago : Delta Books, 19 6 7 .
Eeirstead, B.S.
Canada in World Affairs September 1951 to
October 1953. Toronto: Oxford University P r e s s , 1956.
Kennan, George F. Realities of American FhrelKn Policy.
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954.
Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950.
Mentor Bhoks, 1963.

Toronto:

Kennedy, Edward M. Decisions for a Decade Policies and Pr6grams for the 1970's. Hew York: Doubleday & Company,
Inc.,
1968.
Lloyd, Trevor.
Canada In World Affhirs, 1957-1959.
Oxford University Press,
1968.
Lower, A.R.M.
1940.

Canada and the Far Bast 1940.

Lyon, Peyton V. The Policy Question.
and Stewart Limited, 1963.

Toronto:

Hew York: I.P.R.

Toronto: McClelland

Lyon, Peyton V. Canada in World Affairs, 1961- 1963.
Oxford University Press, i9 6 8 .
Maoridls, Roy C. Foreign Policy In World Politics.
wood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967.

Toronto:
Engle

Mansfield, Mike.
The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the
Shadow. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1966.
Mao Tse-tung.
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I I .
Peking: People's "PÜbïTsh'lng' House , 1952.
Martin, Paul.
Paul Martin Speaks for Canada.
McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967 .

Toronto;

Martin, Paul.
Canada and the Quest for Peace. Vancouver:
The Oopp Clark Publishing Co., 1967.
Masters, Donald C . Canada in World Affairs, 1953 to 1955.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Masters, Roger D.
The Nation is Burdened, American Foreign
Policy in a Changing World. Hew York: Alfred A. Knopf,
Ï96T: "

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
Miller, J.D.B.
The Commonwealth in the World.
Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1965.

London:

Morganthou, E.J. Vietnam and the United States.
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965.
Newman, Robert P.
in Argument.

Washington,

Recognition of Communist China? A Study
New York: The MacMillan Company, 1'964".'

Pan, Stephen, and Daniel Lyons. Vietnam Crisis.
TwAn Circle Publishing Co., 1966I

New York:

Pearson, Lester B. Democracy In World Politics.
S. J. Saunders and Company Ltd., 1955.

Toronto:

Preston, Richard A. Canada In World Affairs.
Toronto: Oxford University Pressl 1965.
Queens Printer.
Canada and the Korean Crisis.
Queen's Printer 1950.

1959 to 1961.
Ottawa:

Raskin, Marcus G . , and Bernard M. Pall.
The Vietnam Reader:
Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and
The' Vietnam Crisis. New York; Random Eou8e"j ï'967'.
Rees, David. Korea: The Limited W a r .
Co. Ltd., 1964.

London: MacMillan &

Reford, Robert V. Canada and Three Crisis.
Deyell Ltd., 196BI

Lindsay: John

Relsohauer, Edwin 0. Beyond Vietnam, the United States and
A s i a . New York: Vintage Books, 1967T
Rupen, R. and R. Farrell.
Vietnam and the Slno-Soviet Dis
pute. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967.
Schoenburn, David.
Vietnam: How We Got In, Row to Get Ou t.
New York: Atheneum, 19 6 8 .
Schurmann, Franz, et.al.
The Politics of Escalation in
Vietnam. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966 .
Snyder, R.S. and E.G. Furness. American Foreign Policy.
New York: Rinehart and Co., 1954.
Soward, P.H. and Edgar Mclnnis.
Canada and the United Nations,
New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 19561
Spanier, John W. American Foreign Policy Since World War I I .
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, i960 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

142

Spanier, J.W.
The Trnman-MacArthur Controversy and the
Korean W a r . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.
Special Report to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference
on Indo-China. London: Her Ma ;]e sty 's Stationary Office,
Reports from 1956 to gresent.
Spencer, Robert A. Canada in World Affairs From UN to NATO
1946 - 1949. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Stebblns, R.P.
The United States in World Affairs 1966. New
York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967.
Stillman, Edmund, and William Pfaff.The New Politics
Amer
ica and the End of the Postwar Wo r l d . New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1961.
Tang Tsou.
America's Failure In China 1941-1950.
University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Chicago:

Taylor, A.,
David Cox and J.D. Cranatsteln.
Peacekeeping,
International Challenge and Canadian Response. Linds ay :
John Deyell L t d ,, 1968 .
Thorp, Willard L., ed. The United States and the Far E a s t .
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Haïï^ Inc., Ï962I
Truman, Harry 3. Years of Trial and H o p e . Vol. I I .
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956.

New York:

Turner, Arthur C., and Leonard Freedman, eds.
Tension Areas
in World Affairs. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co.,

.

7964

U.S. Department of State Publication.
sia the Pacific and
the United States.
Statement by E 0. Relschauer.
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.

U.S. Department of State Publication.
August 1 9 4 9 . Stanford; 1967.

The China White Paper

U.S. Department of State Publication.
Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on
U.S. Policy with. Respect to Mainland China. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 66.
Vandenbosch, Amry, and Richard Butwell.
The Changing Face of
Southeast As i a . Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1966

.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143
Varg, ?.A.
The Making of a Myth : The United States and China
18 9 ^ - 1 9 1 2 . East Lansing; Michigan State University Press,
Warburg, Jaraes P. The United States in the Postwar World.
Uew York: Atheneum, 19^51
Whiting, Allen S. China Grosses the Yalu: The Decision to
Enter the Korean W a r . Santa Monica: The Rand Corpora
tion, The MacMillan Company, I960.
Wilcox, W.A.
Asia and United States Policy.
Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc.l 19^7.

Englewood

W111 iams , 'f.A . The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.
Dell PublishlF^ Gompanyl 1962.
Wolfers, Arnold.
Discord and Collaboration.
Johns Hopkins Pressl 1962.

New York:

Baltimore: The

Young, Kenneth T . Negotiating With the Chinese Communists:
The United States Experience, 19^3-1^^^
New"" Pork :
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1 9 6 8 T
Articles
Clubb, O.E.
"Living with China as a Great Power",
Annals
of the American Academy of Pol itical and Social Sciences.
Vol. 3 5 1 , 19^4, p. 142-147.
Daugherty, W.E.
"China's Official Publicity in the United
States", Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1942, pp.70-

86

.

Dean, A.H.
"The Role of the United States in the Par East",
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Sciences, Vol. 294, July 1954\ p.46-56.
Dean, V.M.
"How Asians View the United States",
Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences.
Vol. 1 7 0 , July 1 9 5 1 , p . 1 2 8 - 1 3 4 .
Graebner, N.A.
"China and Asian Security: An American Dil
emma",
International Journal, Vol. 1 6 , Summer 1 9 6 1 ,
p.21 3-231.
Greathead, E.D.
"Canada and the Asian World", International
Journal. Vol. XX, Summer, 1 9 6 5 , p.367-371.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144
Guhln, Michael A.
"The United States and the Chinese Peo
ple's Republic: The Non-Recognition Policy Reviewed",
International Affairs. Vol. 45, No.1, January 1969,

pT'"5'4-'^TI

Henderson, W.
"South Vietnam Finds Itself",
Vol. 35, No.2, January 1957, p.271-283.

Foreign Affairs,

Holmes, J.W.
"Canada and the United States in World Politics",
Foreign Affairs. Vol. 39, No.2, January 1962, p.105-117.
Holmes, J.W.
"Geneva-1954", International Journal, Vol.22,
Summer 1967, p.457-483.
Holmes, J.W.
"Canadian External Policies Since 1945", Int
ernational Journal. Vol.18, Spring 1963, p.137-148.
Hornbeck, S.k.
"Which Chinese?",
No.3, October 1955, p.24-39.

Foreign Affairs. Vol.34,

Masland, J.W.
"Missionary Influence Upon American Par East
ern Policy",
Pacific Historical Review. Vol.X, Sept
ember 3, 1941, p.279-296.
Melby, J.F.
"The Ooldwar - The Second Phase: China", Inter
national Journal, Vol.23, No.3, Summer 1968, p.421-435.
Pacificus,
"Canada in Indo-China",
International Journal,
Vol.11, No.4, Autumn 1956, p.270-27&.
Pearson, L.B.
"Canada's Asian Policy",
1952, p.37-40.

United A s i a , Vol.4,

Rajan, M.S.
"The Indo-Canadian Entente",
International
Journal. Vol.17, Autumn 1962, p.358-385.
Ronning, 0.
"Nanking: 1950", International Journal. Vol.22,
Summer 1967, p .44l-456.
Singh, E.P,
"Canada the United States and Vietnam",
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.6, No.2,
July 19&8, p.125-149.
Stanley, G.F.G.
"The Korean Dilemma",
International Journal.
Vol.7, No.4, Autumn 1952, p.278-283.
Stevenson, J.A.
"Canada, Free and Dependent",
Foreign
Affairs. Vol.29, No.3, April 1951, p.456-467.
Wright, Q.
"Non Recognition of China and International Ten
sions",
Current History. Vol.34, N o . 199, March 1958,
p. 152-157.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

145
Whiting, A.
"How We Almost Went to War with China",
Magazine. April 29, 1969.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Loot

VITA AUOTOEIS
Family ;

William Mlcheal Scarfla, youngest son of
Louis Scarfla and his wife Eve Martin;
Born May 27, 194-5, at Rochester, New York.

Education;
1951-1959

Received elementary education at Sacred Heart
Grammar School, at Rochester,

1959-1963

Received secondary education at Aquinas
Institute, Rochester.
Junior Matriculation,
1963.

1963-1967

Registered as an undergraduate In the Faculty
of Arts and Sciences at the University of
Windsor 1963. Received Bachelor of Arts
May 1 9 6 7 .

1967

Registered as Post-Graduate In the Department
of Political Science.
Candidate for the Degree
of Master of Arts.
Thesis submitted May 1969.

Other Activities:
1967-1968

Granted a graduate asslstantshlp in the Depart
ment of Political Science, University of Windsor.

1968-1969

Granted a teaching asslstantshlp in the Department of Political Science, University of Windsor

1968-1969

Detroit Edison Company Canadian-American Graduate
Research Fellowship.

146

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

